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Dying declarations have taken on increased importance since the
Supreme Court indicated that even if testimonial, they may present a
unique exception to its new confrontation jurisprudence. Starting
with Crawford v. Washington in 2004, the Court has developed strict
rules concerning the use of testimonial statements made by unavaila-
ble declarants. Generally, testimonial statements (those made with the
expectation that they will be used to prosecute the accused) may be
admitted only if they were previously subject to cross-examination.
The only exceptions appear to be dying declarations and forfeiture by
wrongdoing when the accused intentionally rendered the declarant
unavailable.
This Article argues that the dying declaration merits examination
for two important reasons. First, its status as an exception to the
Court's new confrontation rules seriously undermines the Court's
dramatic new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and demon-
strates the internal contradictions of the Court's originalist approach.
Second, the dying declaration exception presents one of the few re-
maining ways in which testimonial statements by absent victims of
domestic violence can be heard.
Remarking on the prominence of women both in the Court's re-
cent confrontation jurisprudence and in the dying declaration case
law, this Article examines the role of women's voices and the means
by which those voices are either excluded from or invited into the
courtroom. The Article also explores the policy issues stemming from
the admission of unconfronted statements by victims of femicide. It
attempts to balance respect and justice for victims with fairness to the
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accused and argues that dying declarations by victims of domestic vi-
olence possess unique qualities that justify a limited exception to the
confrontation right.
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INTRODUCTION
The dying declaration is the hearsay exception that everyone loves
to hate.' It seems antiquated and parochial, depending, as it does, on re-
ligious beliefs in divine punishment for its reliability and policy justifica-
tions. In essence, the dying declaration exception admits statements by
dying individuals about the cause of their death, so long as those making
the statements know they are dying and have no hope of recovery. The
traditional theory is that, because no one would dare face the wrath of
1. For instance, McCormick on Evidence deems it "the most mystical in its theory and tradi-
tionally among the most arbitrary in its limitations." 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 309, at 363 (Ken-
neth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); see also Thurston v. Fritz, 138 P. 625, 627 (Kan. 1914) ("We are con-
fronted with a restrictive rule of evidence commendable only for its age, its respectability resting solely
upon a habit of judicial recognition, formed without reason, and continued without justification.").
[Vol. 20101412
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God by dying with a lie on her lips,2 dying declarations are particularly
trustworthy.
What was perhaps the laughing stock of hearsay exceptions, the ul-
timate proof of Justice Holmes's observation that "a page of history is
worth a volume of logic"3 has taken on increased importance given the
Supreme Court's recent dramatic rethinking of the confrontation right.
Under the new jurisprudence, the Court, starting with Crawford v. Wash-
ington,4 has required that all testimonial statements either be uttered in
court by a live witness available for cross-examination or have been
cross-examined at some earlier time if the witness is currently unavaila-
ble.' Some dying declarations fall within the Court's new definition of
"testimonial statements" 6-a murky term that at the very least includes
statements made with the expectation that they will be used in a future
prosecution. Nevertheless, the Court has also indicated, in dicta, that
such dying declarations may present a unique exception to its new con-
frontation rules.' Thus, even though the deceased is not available to be
cross-examined, the government may be able to use the dying statement
against the accused.8 Therefore, it is a propitious time to take a look at
this old, but not necessarily venerated, hearsay exception and to question
its continued viability as well as its relationship to the Sixth Amendment
confrontation right.
This Article argues that the dying declaration merits examination
for two important reasons. First, its exceptionality seriously undermines
the Court's dramatic new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and
demonstrates the internal contradictions of the Court's originalist ap-
proach. Second, the dying declaration exception is not quite as silly as it
first appears and may have some modern utility even in a secular age.9 It
presents one of the few remaining ways in which testimonial statements
by absent victims of domestic violence can be heard.
Part I of this Article presents the history of the dying declaration
exception, focusing on the crucial element of awareness by the speaker
that death is imminent. This Part considers various critiques of the ex-
ception, many of which are valid, but it also finds justification for the ex-
2. As noted by the Supreme Court, "[N]o person, who is immediately going into the presence
of his Maker, will do so with a lie upon his lips." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (quoting
Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881)).
3. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921); see Michael J. Polelle, The Death of
Dying Declarations in a Post-Crawford World, 71 MO. L. REV. 285, 285 (2006) (introducing his exten-
sive critique of dying declarations with this famous quotation).
4. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5. Id. at 59.
6. See id. at 51-52 (discussing statements that are considered testimonial).
7. Id. at 56 n.6.
8. See id. ("Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for
admitting even those that clearly are.").
9. One need not posit a godless modem society to maintain that the concrete medieval notions
of divine judgment and eternal damnation on which the dying declaration exception is based do not
figure prominently in modem secular society. See Polelle, supra note 3, at 300-01.
No. 5]
HeinOnline -- 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1413 2010
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
ception due to the trustworthiness of the statements, their necessity for
prosecution, and the accused's quasi-forfeiture of the right to complain
about lack of confrontation where the victim is dead.
Part II outlines the Court's new approach to confrontation, begin-
ning with the 2004 Crawford case that lays out the new standard for "tes-
timonial" statements-that is, statements made by a person with the in-
tent to create testimony. This Part notes the significant impact the new
confrontation jurisprudence has had in domestic violence prosecutions in
which, for reasons of love, fear, shame, or distrust of the legal system,
victims who made statements to police decline to participate in the pros-
ecution of their intimate partners. To the extent that their statements
were testimonial, they are lost, and the government's attempts to prose-
cute cases without the victim's testimony have been severely curtailed.
Part II also looks at the Court's treatment, so far only in dicta, of the dy-
ing declaration. All indications are that when presented with the ques-
tion directly, the Court will hold that dying declarations are admissible as
an exception to the Confrontation Clause even when testimonial. The
dying declaration exception existed at the time the Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses was written, and the drafters clearly did not
intend to abrogate its use.
Part III of this Article explores how the existence of the dying dec-
laration as an exception to Crawford subverts the Court's categorical and
originalist approach to confrontation. Part III advocates seeing the ex-
ception not as a regrettable historical anomaly, but rather as an indict-
ment of the current wooden and unhelpful approach to Confrontation.
The difficult policy questions raised by confrontation deserve more bal-
ance and nuance than the Court's approach has granted them. Ironically,
the older dying declaration cases, on whose authority Crawford relies but
whose methods Crawford eschews, exhibit the nuance, sense of policy,
concern for society, and fairness that the current confrontation jurispru-
dence sorely lacks. 10
Looking specifically at the role of women, Part IV finds important
connections between Crawford and gender. The facts of Crawford and
its progeny indicate that the dynamics of violence against women have
played a key role in the development of the new confrontation jurispru-
dence. In a parallel inquiry, Part IV draws a connection between the dy-
ing declaration and women killed by their intimate partners. The promi-
nence of women in both confrontation and dying declaration doctrine
invites interesting questions about the role of women's voices and the
means by which those voices-in this case, from the grave-are either
excluded or invited into the courtroom.
Finally, Part V explores the issue of unconfronted statements by vic-
tims of domestic violence, particularly when the violence ends in death.
10. See infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 20101414
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Such dying words raise very difficult questions about respect and justice
for victims on the one hand, and fairness to the accused on the other.
This Part strives to balance these concerns in light of the strictures of the
dying declaration exception and argues that dying declarations by victims
of domestic violence have unique qualities that justify a limited exception
to the confrontation right.
I. DYING DECLARATIONS
The dying declaration exception has served as a longstanding excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. It admits out of court statements for their truth
when: (1) the declarant is unavailable;" (2) the statement concerns the
cause of the declarant's impending death;" and (3) the statement is made
while the declarant believes his death is imminent. 3  Generally, under
the common law the dying declaration was limited to homicide cases, al-
though some early case law applied dying declarations to prove wills and
deeds.14 Scholars attribute the limitation to homicide prosecutions to a
misinterpretation of an English treatise. 5 If indeed dying declarations
11. This factor is almost always met because he or she did in fact die, although technically under
the Federal Rules of Evidence one can make a dying declaration, not die, and be unavailable for other
reasons. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a). There is a split of authority among the states concerning whether
mere unavailability is sufficient, and a minority require that the declarant be dead as opposed to as-
serting a privilege, such as too sick to testify, out of the jurisdiction, etc. This minority includes Cali-
fornia, see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 (West 2010), and New York, see People v. Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109,
113-14 (N.Y. 1986). This issue rarely arises, however. See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1431, at 276 (1974) ("Conceivably, there might be still a necessity if the
witness, though supposed to be dying had recovered and had since left the jurisdiction, but this case
had never occurred, and the question never arose."). It is, however, arguably significant for determin-
ing the scope of the dying declaration as it relates to the Confrontation Clause generally. See Peter
Nicolas, "I'm Dying to Tell You What Happened": The Admissibility of Testimonial Dying Declara-
tions Post-Crawford, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 534-38 (2010). It is fair to assume that in the dy-
ing declaration cases discussed in the context of domestic violence homicides, the declarant has died.
For policy reasons, the quasi-forfeiture argument in favor of dying declarations is much stronger if the
declarant actually dies. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
12. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
13. The modem version found in the Federal Rules of Evidence expands the dying declaration's
applicability beyond homicide to include civil matters, but the criteria are essentially the same as un-
der common law. FED. R. EVID. 804(b). Rule 804(b) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's death was
imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending
death.
Id.
14. There is precedent for applying dying declaration to civil cases such as property deeds, wills,
and contracts. Wilson v. Boerum, 1858 Ant. N.P. Cas. 239, 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) ("The same prin-
ciples which make dying declarations evidence in criminal cases, make them a fortiori evidence in civil
cases."). See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 311, at 368 ("[U]ntil the beginning of the
1800s ... [dying] declarations were admitted in civil and criminal cases without distinction ..."); Ni-
colas, supra note 11, at 514-21; Annotation, Admissibility of Dying Declarations in Cases Not Involv-
ing Homicide, 49 A.L.R. 1282, 1282 (1927), supplemented by 91 A.L.R. 560,561-62 (1934).
15. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 311, at 368 (tracing the error to the mis-
reading of Sergeant East, Pleas of the Crown); 5 W1GMORE, supra note 11, § 1431, at 277 (making a
similar observation).
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are reliable, the argument goes, they should be extended beyond homi-
cide to other crimes and to civil cases. As will be argued in Part IV, the
extra factor of homicide strengthens the policy argument in favor of ad-
mitting dying declarations.
This hearsay exception is traceable to a famous 1789 English Case,
The King v. Woodcock.16  Woodcock admitted a dying statement by a
woman blaming her husband for her severe injuries after being beaten.7
The court justified admitting the unconfronted statement on the grounds
that such statements are "made in extremity, when the party is at the
point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone: when every
motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most
powerful considerations to speak the truth."'" The court held that "a
situation so solemn, and so awful, is considered by the law as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered
in a Court of Justice."' 19 This traditional justification of the dying
declaration is, as words such as "awful" and "solemn" indicate,
religiously based. Fear of heaven's ultimate punishment for false
testimony-a violation of one of the Ten Commandments20-prompts
sincerity. The dying person would not dare depart this life and greet her
maker with a lie on her lips.21
Professor Desmond Manderson observes that rather than being an
exception to the hearsay rule, the dying declaration is, in some deeper
sense, the embodiment of the rule itself.22 The oath as part of regular in-
16. (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (P.C.). The earliest reported dying declaration case is Rex v. Rea-
son, (1722) 1 Strange 499 (K.B.), in which a clergyman reported the dying words of a homicide victim.
See Polelle, supra note 3, at 290; Recent Case, Dying Declarations, 17 YALE L.J. 403 (1908).
17. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 354.
18. Id. at 353. The court cites Loffit's Edition of Gilb. Evidence and Shakespeare's King John,
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING JOHN act 5, sc. 6, 1. 27. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353 n.2(b). Al-
though the reporter's footnote cites Act V, scene VI, which has nothing to do with dying statements, it
is clear that the court meant to cite Act V, scene IV, lines 22-27 of King John, where the character
Melun, who is dying, states:
Have I not hideous death within my view,
Retaining but a quantity of life,
Which bleeds away, even as a form of wax
Resolveth from his figure 'gainst the fire?
What in the world should make me now deceive,
Since I must lose the use of all deceit?
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING JOHN, act 5, sc. 4,11. 22-27.
19. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353.
20. Deuteronomy 5:20 (King James) ("Neither shalt thou bear false witness against thy neigh-
bour."); Exodus 23:1 (King James) ("Thou shalt not raise a false report: put not thine hand with the
wicked to be an unrighteous witness."); see also Psalm 23:3-4 (King James) ("Who shall ascend into
the hill of the LORD? or who shall stand in his holy place? He that hath clean hands, and a pure
heart; who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully.").
21. Cf. Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 550, 576 (1848) (noting that the "delirious ravings
of a man in extremis" were fraudulent, and the testator, upon sober reflection, would not have been
willing to adhere to a fraudulent will because such action, "to his conscience and his God, present him
as dying with a falsehood on his lips").
22. Desmond Manderson, Et Lex Perpetua: Dying Declarations & Mozart's Requiem, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1621. 1630 (1999) ("The rule of dying declarations is therefore not an exception to
[Vol. 20101416
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court testimony is meant to remind the witness of heaven's punishment
or reward. How much more veracity can we expect from someone whose
rendezvous with her creator and heavenly judge is coming much sooner?
As the Supreme Court explained, dying declarations "are equivalent to
the evidence of a living witness upon oath."23 For the declarant, "every
motive to falsehood must be supposed to have been silenced, and the
mind to be impelled by the most powerful considerations to tell the
truth."24
A. History
The dying declaration exception appears in some very early Ameri-
can case law. For instance, in State v. Moody,25 a North Carolina case
from 1798, the court explained that dying declarations may be received
"of one so near his end that no hope of life remains, for then the solemni-
ty of the occasion is a good security for his speaking the truth, as much so
as if he were under the obligation of an oath. ' 26 The North Carolina
court warned, however, "if at the time of making the declaration he has
reasonable prospects and hope of life, such declarations ought not to be
received; for there is room to apprehend he may be actuated by motives
of revenge and an irritated mind, to declare what possibly may not be
true."27
Thus, even early in this nation's history, dying declarations were
met with some concern. The court in Moody is keenly aware of motives
of "revenge" and the influences of an "irritated mind." 2 Indeed, a dis-
senting North Carolina justice challenged the admission of a written re-
port of the dying declaration, querying, "how is it possible a man can be a
witness to prove his own death?"29 This skepticism is not aberrational in
the case law, but constitutes a theme running throughout the develop-
ment of the dying declaration that explains in part courts' rigid applica-
tion of its doctrinal constraints. 30
the requirement of an administrated oath, but rather its origin and its paradigm.... [Tihe principle of
dying declarations is no exception to the hearsay rule, but the grounds of its possibility.").
23. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899).
24. Id. (citations omitted).
25. 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 50 (1798).
26. Id. at 50.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 51.
30. A law review note from 1897 asserts that "the tendency to restrict the scope of the exception
known as 'Dying Declarations' has been practically universal." Note, Contradiction of Dying Declara-
tions, 10 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518 (1897). The note dismisses the reliability of dying declarations and
explains that "the reason usually assigned for this exception at present is rather the necessity which
requires this evidence to convict murderers against whom, from the nature of the crime, other testi-
mony is often lacking, than any intrinsic value in what is said in anticipation of death." Id.
No. 5] 1417
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The Supreme Court of the United States dealt with the dying decla-
ration exception in Mattox v. United States,3 which it heard twice. Mat-
tox I concerned an appeal from a murder conviction in which the Court
reversed for many procedural irregularities. 3 The issue of a dying decla-
ration was also presented.13 Interestingly, the declaration by the dying
man was offered by the accused as exculpatory evidence and therefore
could not trigger Sixth Amendment concerns?4 The dying declarant is
alleged to have said to the accused's mother, "I know Clyde Mattox, your
son, and he was not one of the parties who shot me. ' 35 Mattox I held that
the decedent's statement met the dying declaration's requirements, and
the court emphasized that "it must be shown by the party offering them
in evidence that they were made under a sense of impending death."36
Without outright reference to religion, Mattox I explained the policy
of "a declaration in articulo mortis. '37 The Court opined that the "certain
expectation of almost immediate death will remove all temptation to
falsehood, and enforce as strict adherence to the truth as the obligation
of an oath could impose."38 Mattox I also issued an important caveat that
"the evidence must be received with the utmost caution" and counseled
that it be rejected if any hope of recovery tainted "the awful and solemn
situation. 39
Mattox H returned to the Supreme Court after the accused was
again convicted on retrial and concerned the prosecutor's use at the
second trial of two witnesses' prior testimony.40 These witnesses had
been cross-examined at the first trial but had died, and were therefore
unavailable for confrontation at the retrial.4' The Court rejected an over-
ly literal application of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause that
31. Mattox v. United States (Mattox If), 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Mattox v. United States (Mattox I),
146 U.S. 140 (1892).
32. These irregularities included jury misbehavior in reading newspaper reports about the trial
and thus learning of the defendant's alleged prior bad acts, Mattox 1, 146 U.S. at 143, 150-51, and the
statement by the bailiff to jurors that "[t]his is the third fellow he has killed," id. at 142 (quoting affi-
davit offered by defendant).
33. See id. at 151.
34. Id. at 142. The Court explained that "[d]ying declarations are admissible on a trial for mur-
der as to the fact of the homicide and the person by whom it was committed, in favor of the defendant
as well as against him." Id. at 151. In discussing Regina v. Perkins, (1840) 9 Car. & P. 395, the Court
noted that "[tihere the declaration was against the accused, and obviously no more rigorous rule
should be applied when it is in his favor." Mattox 1, 146 U.S. at 152.
35. Id. at 142 (quoting counsel for the defendant).
36. Id. at 151. In Mattox I, the declarant knew he was dying; the physician who came to the
house and stayed the night to care for the declarant informed him that he would soon die. Id. at 141-
42 ("'[Cjhances are all against you; I do not think there is any show for you at all."') (quoting physi-
cian testimony). Another indication of the vintage nature of the case is the behavior of the doctor.
Who makes house calls anymore and who stays for hours tending to the dying?
37. Id. at 152.
38. id.
39. Id.
40. Mattox H, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895).
41. Id. at 240.
[Vol. 20101418
HeinOnline -- 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1418 2010
HER LAST WORDS
would have prohibited their former testimony.42 Instead, after reviewing
authorities in the various states and England, the Court concluded that
prior confronted testimony was permissible.
Mattox II emphasized the need for practicality and flexibility in ap-
plying the Sixth Amendment. The Court conceded that there was a
strong argument for an absolutist approach to the confrontation right.43
The Court, however, consciously struck a balance between the constitu-
tional command and the needs of public policy, noting that "however be-
neficent in their operation and valuable to the accused," such rules "must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessi-
ties of the case."" The Court objected to the notion that an accused
"should go scot free simply because death has closed the mouth of that
witness."45 According to the Court, this "would be carrying his constitu-
tional protection to an unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom dec-
lares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order
that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused."46
The Court also indicated its own fidelity to an originalist interpreta-
tion of the Sixth Amendment that, in its view, had always included vari-
ous exceptions. The Court explained, "We are bound to interpret the
Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was
adopted, not as reaching out for new guaranties of the rights of the citi-
zen."'47
Although not directly at issue in Mattox II, the dying declaration
was offered as an analogy to support what the Court perceived to be its
flexible and sensible approach to the right of confrontation. The Court
noted:
For instance, there could be nothing more directly contrary to the
letter of the provision in question than the admission of dying dec-
larations. They are rarely made in the presence of the accused, they
are made without any opportunity for examination or cross-
examination, nor is the witness brought face to face with the jury,
yet from time immemorial they have been treated as competent tes-
timony, and no one would have the hardihood at this day to ques-
tion their admissibility. They are admitted not in conformity with
any general rule regarding the admission of testimony, but as an ex-
ception to such rules, simply from the necessities of the case, and to
prevent a manifest failure of justice.48
42. Id. at 243-44.
43. Id. at 243 ("There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never lose the bene-
fit of any of these safeguards even by the death of the witness, and that, if notes of his testimony are
permitted to be read, he is deprived of the advantage of that personal presence of the witness before
the jury which the law has designed for his protection.").
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 243-44.
No. 5] 1419
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Interestingly, the Mattox cases, which are often cited as the proof-
texts for the persistence and relevance of the dying declaration, raise the
specific exception only in dicta. In Mattox I, the dying declaration was
not used against the accused-rather, the accused wished to admit the
statement; the question, therefore, was solely one of hearsay, not con-
frontation.49 In Mattox II, the issue before the Court concerned the ad-
missibility of former testimony. 0 Mattox H trotted out the dying declara-
tion as proof that the Sixth Amendment could not really mean what it
said. " The Court used the reductio ad absurdum argument that if a liter-
al reading of the Sixth Amendment were used to ban former testimony,
then dying declarations would also be banned by the right of confronta-
tion-an interpretation that everyone agreed was incorrect.2 At least,
the Justices in Mattox II did not have the "hardihood" to do so."
B. Focus on Awareness of Imminent Death
Awareness of death's imminence is central to the doctrine. Justice
Cardozo's 1933 opinion in Shepard v. United States54 is the most famous
dying declaration case and is commonly studied in evidence classes
throughout America. Mrs. Shepard, lingering from a lethal arsenic dose,
said regarding her husband, "Dr. Shepard has poisoned me."55 Justice
Cardozo rejected her statement as not fitting within the dying declaration
exception, explaining: "To make out a dying declaration the declarant
must have spoken without hope of recovery and in the shadow of im-
pending death.... The patient must have spoken with the consciousness
of a swift and certain doom."56 Even though Mrs. Shepard lingered in
agony for weeks, dying a gruesome Madame Bovary-type death,57 at the
time she made the statement she still "did not speak as one dying, an-
nouncing to the survivors a definitive conviction, a legacy of knowledge
on which the world might act when she had gone. '58
One can accuse Justice Cardozo in Shepard of overscrupulousness.
Ironically, such care in applying the dying declaration was not evident in
49. Mattox 1, 146 U.S. 140, 141-42 (1892).
50. Mattox H, 156 U.S. at 238.
51. See id. at 243.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 243-44. In Carver v. United States, yet another appeal the Supreme Court heard twice,
the accused was charged with murdering his girlfriend, and the issue in the case was whether he shot
her by accident or on purpose. Carver v. United States (Carver If), 164 U.S. 694, 695 (1897). The
Court held that some of the victim's statements were "made under the impression of almost immediate
dissolution" and hence were admissible as dying declarations. Carver v. United States (Carver 1), 160
U.S. 553, 554 (1896). The Court did, however, allow the accused to impeach the victim's dying decla-
ration without establishing the necessary foundation. Carver II, 164 U.S. at 697-98.
54. 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
55. Id. at 98.
56. Id. at 99-100.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 100.
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the original case laying out its parameters, The King v. Woodcock, when
the court acknowledged that "it seems impossible to find out, whether
the deceased herself apprehended that she was in such a state of mortali-
ty as would inevitably oblige her soon to answer before her Maker .... -9
In light of this uncertainty, the court left the question for the jury to de-
termine.6 But it is fair to say that since Woodcock, courts have tended to
apply the dying declaration narrowly, reflecting a fear that without this
guarantee of reliability, too much unsworn hearsay untested by cross-
examination would be admitted.6"
The level of certainty required by the exception might at first seem
daunting, and there are certainly numerous cases in which courts demand
irrefutable evidence that the declarant knew she was dying.62 The case
law is rife with heart-wrenching examples in which no doubt is left that
the declarant is aware of his or her imminent demise. For example, a
New York court quoted a declarant as saying: "I am going to die. What
are my children going to do after this? ' 63 Another example: "I am very
sick. I shall soon be with my mother. I shall see Jesus." 6 Calling for the
priest to administer last rites is another surefire indication of conscious-
ness of death.65 Additionally, many cases involve physicians who brutally
deliver the unvarnished truth that the declarant had very little time left.
66
(Such cases indicate that any nostalgia we have for the bedside manners
of the doctors of yesteryear seems misplaced.)
Although one could walk away with the impression that the dying
declaration was very narrowly and rigorously construed, it appears that
some dying declarations were more pro forma than Shepard and other
famously strict cases would lead us to believe. It is important to realize
59. The King v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353-54 (P.C.) (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 354.
61. In State v. Belcher, the South Carolina Supreme Court observed:
The only case in the whole range of the criminal law where evidence is admissible against the ac-
cused without an opportunity of cross-examination, is that of "dying declarations" in cases of ho-
micide, and they are only admissible from the necessity of the case, and when made in extremity-
when the party is at the point of death, and is conscious of it-when every hope of this world is
gone, and every motive to falsehood is silenced by the most powerful considerations to speak the
truth. For the reason that the admission of such statement is exceptional, they ought always to be
excluded unless they come within the rule in every respect.
13 S.C. 459,462-63 (1880).
62. See, e.g., Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353 n.a3 (citing King v. Welbourn, 1 East C.L. 359,360
(1792) (holding that a woman who had been poisoned in an attempt to induce abortion did not know
she was dying because she did not feel any pain and may have thought she was getting better, even
though she had been told by an apothecary that she was going to die)).
63. People v. Del Vermo, 85 N.E. 690,696 (N.Y. 1908).
64. State v. Phillips, 277 N.W. 609, 615 (N.D. 1938). The court explained that the declarant's
mother was dead. And, in case any doubt remained, when asked if she expected to get well, the decla-
rant replied, "No." Id.
65. See Carver 11, 164 U.S. 694, 695 (1897) ("The fact that the deceased had received extreme
unction had some tendency to show that she must have known that she was in articulo mortis....").
66. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hebert, 163 N.E. 189, 191 (Mass. 1928) (quoting doctor to have
said to decedent: "You know you are getting worse, don't you?" and "We have been talking it over,
and we don't think you are going to get better").
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that many of the dying declarants lingered for weeks.67 Their deaths
were certain, but also slow, and provided plenty of time for the police to
come and take a statement. Normally, statements by victims, even if
sworn, were not admissible unless the accused was present and able to
question the witness.68 Dying declarations, however, did not require con-
frontation or the presence of the accused, and there is evidence that in
some jurisdictions dying declarations were regularly committed to writ-
ing. 9 The benefits of written statements are obvious-they lead to cer-
tainty about what the decedent said.70 But they come at a substantial
cost. Such statements become highly formalized and, ironically, look ex-
actly like the core testimonial statements-affidavits procured by law en-
forcement-that the new Crawford jurisprudence designated as the cen-
tral concern of the confrontation right.
In 1915, the New York Court of Appeals sounded a warning, noting
that "a new custom has come into vogue among coroners in reference to
dying declarations of victims of crime." 1 The form questions included:
"Have you any hope of recovery from the effects of the injury that you
have received?"" The court stated that if the questions were put "in a
perfunctory manner" or received "a careless assent," an "essential prere-
quisite to the admission of unsworn declarations of fact" would be miss-
ing. The court noted with distress that the coroner who took the dying
declaration testified that he regularly used a preprinted questionnaire,
and had done so to generate at least twenty dying statements from dif-
ferent declarants in the six months preceding the trial.74
The court observed that if the declarant were not in the proper
frame of mind and the strictures of the dying declaration were "disre-
garded in the slightest degree, the evidentiary value of the declaration is
67. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 186 S.E. 488, 489 (N.C. 1936) (stating that victim died three weeks
after botched abortion); State v. Vance, 110 P. 434, 435 (Utah 1910) ("[On November 26, 1907, the
perpetrator] with his fists, hands, and feet did strike, kick, beat, and bruise the said Mary Vance, and
did then and there, and thereby, inflict upon the body of the said Mary Vance a mortal contusion,
bruise, and wound, from which the said Mary Vance languished until the 8th day of December, 1907,
when she died....").
68. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,46 (2004).
69. See, e.g., Murphy v. People, 37 Ill. 447, 452 (1865) ("1, William Shies, of the county of Kane,
State of Illinois, having no hope of life, and having the fear of God before me, do declare this to be a
true statement of facts of an occurrence hereinafter related ...."); Boyle v. State, 97 Ind. 322, 327
(1884) ("Q. Have you given up all hope of life? A. I have, of course. Q. Is this declaration which you
now make free from all malice? A. Yes, it is; I forgive him."); Hebert, 163 N.E. at 191 ("Miss Fenton, a
stenographer, testified that she was called to the Cooley Dickinson Hospital where Mrs. Lyman was a
patient and took her statement in shorthand .... ").
70. People v. Callaghan, 6 P. 49, 56 (Utah 1885) ("Where such declarations are taken down in
writing at the time they are uttered, although not signed by the deceased, being more reliable and ac-
curate than the memory of most men, they should be produced and read at the trial.") (citation omit-
ted).
71. People v. Kane, 107 N.E. 655,659 (N.Y. 1915).
72. Id. at 660.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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wholly destroyed."75 In fact, the attempts to generate dying declarations
occasionally led to leading questions propounded upon people whose
awareness and sharpness were fading.76
Modern courts particularly appreciate it when a declarant requests
last rites, announces that she is going to die, or is so informed by a medi-
cal professional, but occasionally courts will infer the declarant's know-
ledge of imminent death from dire medical circumstances.77 Modern
courts will sometimes allow the objective circumstances to serve as an in-
dication that the declarant knew he or she was dying,78 and it is not hard
to find cases where the court merely extrapolates from the severity of the
injury.79 By and large, however, courts today still reject dying declara-
tions if the declarant did not know death was imminent.80
C. Cultural Features of Dying Declarations
Dying declarations reflect the ways of dying in each particular age.
Today, deaths involving dying declarations are dominated by car wrecks
and gun violence; historically, dying declarations commonly were made
in shoot-outs in the Old West," poisonings,8 and deaths due to bank
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., People v. Callaghan, 6 P. 49, 56 (Utah 1885) (noting the deceased's enfeebled state
and the difficulty in obtaining answers but nevertheless holding that the declarations were admissible
because they were "answers to leading questions").
77. See, e.g., People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 971 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the requirement
of knowledge of impending death was satisfied when the declarant had been shot and severely
wounded, expressed a fear of dying, lay in a fetal position, and did not utter another word after mak-
ing his statement).
78. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 310, at 366 ("The belief may be shown cir-
cumstantially by the apparent fatal quality of the wound, by the statements made to the declarant by
doctors or others of the hopelessness of the condition, or by other circumstances, but it must be
shown." (citation omitted)).
79. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 836 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("We find that [decla-
rant's] second identification statement made to the EMT very shortly after he had been shot multiple
times, established a reasonable inference that Wallace was still under the effect of the event. [Decla-
rant's] third identification statement to the nurses was made when he was 'in extremis' and within thir-
ty minutes of being shot. The trial court may also consider the surrounding details of the declarant's
rapidly deteriorating condition when determining whether the statement is reliable as a dying declara-
tion."); State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Minn. 2005) ("[Tlhe evidence suggests [the declarant]
recognized the severity of his wounds and believed death was imminent. He had been stabbed in the
neck, piercing his larynx, and shot in the chest, severing a major artery. His bleeding was severe, and
he clutched his chest as he spoke.").
80. See, e.g., James v. Marshall, No. CV 06-3399-CAS(E), 2008 WL 4601238, at *20 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 13, 2008) (finding on habeas in which prosecution did not seek admission of the victim's state-
ment as a dying declaration in the original trial that there was no evidence to prove that gunshot vic-
tim, who was being treated by paramedics and conversing with them in the ambulance, had a sense of
impending death); People v. Stiff, 904 N.E.2d. 1174, 1178, 1180 (Il. App. Ct. 2009) ("[Tlhe record is
devoid of evidence that [the declarant] believed that his death was imminent at the time he made the
statement ....").
81. See, e.g., State v. Nowells, 109 N.W. 1016, 1017 (Iowa 1906) (explaining that after saloon
hopping, victim was shot over a game of craps, his last words were "Tell mother goodbye," and then
he "immediately became convulsed in the final death struggle"); State v. Foot You, 32 P. 1031, 1031-
32 (Or. 1893) (describing a fight at the "Temperance Saloon" over a Chinese gambling game called
"Tan Tan").
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robberies and other criminal activity.83 One factor common to both older
and modern cases is the frequent scenario of death by the hand of an in-
timate partner.Y The relationship between domestic violence and dying
declarations is an important one, explored below.8 1
It is impossible to know how many dying declarations are actually
uttered, but it is interesting to speculate about why dying declarations
appear more prevalent in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and beginning of
the twentieth century case law than they are now. Looking at the older
cases, three explanations come to mind. First, given the state of medical
knowledge and technology, there were simply more opportunities to
make dying declarations than there are today. Before antibiotics and so-
phisticated surgeries under hygienic conditions, more people died of
wounds that today would not kill them.86 And, those folks in previous
generations lingered for days or weeks before they died, giving them am-
ple opportunities to make dying declarations.8
Second, the doctrine of dying declarations requires that the decla-
rant have abandoned all hope of recovery. Whether it is our faith in
modern medicine, our genuinely optimistic outlook,88 or our denial of
death,89 it seems that this requirement is harder to fulfill in modern
Western society. Although the power of the belief in imminent death to
bring forth truthful statements is arguably diminished in modern, secular
82. See Nordgren v. People, 71 N.E. 1042 (Il1. 1904) (reversing conviction based on dying decla-
ration by wife who charged her husband with giving her whisky laced with poison because the good
character of the husband, which was attested to by seventeen witnesses, created reasonable doubt as to
his guilt); Puryear v. Commonwealth, 1 S.E. 512 (Va. 1887) (relating to a dying woman who made a
charge that her husband had killed her with poison mixed in whisky). Mixing poison into whiskey was
apparently a common mode of delivery. See, e.g., Fults v. State, 204 S.W. 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918).
83. See, e.g., Simpson v. State, 148 S.E. 511, 512-13 (Ga. 1929) (involving declarant who was a
bank cashier and was shot in a robbery); State v. Burns, 33 Mo. 483, 485 (1863) (involving declarant
who was a police officer shot while pursuing suspects in a burglary); Commonwealth v. Roddy, 39 A.
211, 211 (Pa. 1898) (explaining that burglars tortured declarant to force him to tell them where money
was hidden).
84. Although there are undoubtedly murderous wives and girlfriends, see, e.g., Weyrich v.
People, 89 Ill. 90, 92 (1878) (involving wife indicted for the murder of her husband by poisoning);
Fields v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.2d 1021, 1022 (Ky. 1938) (involving husband's dying declaration in
regard to his wife who shot him), the vast majority of intimate partner victims are women.
85. See infra Part IV.B.
86. Surgery was extremely risky in the nineteenth century. Patients faced problems with hy-
giene, anesthesia and infection, shock, and blood loss. See Science Museum, Surgery, http://www.
sciencemuseum.org.uk/broughttolife/themes/surgery.aspx (last visited July 25, 2010) (detailing the evo-
lutionary progress of medicine).
87. See Digital History, Responses to Death in Nineteenth Century America, http://www.
digitalhistory.uh.edu/historyonline/usdeathl.cfm (last visited July 25, 2010) ("A century ago it was im-
possible to evade the fact of death. Premature death remained commonplace. As late as 1900, the
chance of a marriage lasting forty years was just one in three. Death typically took place in the home
following a protracted deathbed watch.").
88. Some famous examples of this optimism include: "Die? I should say not, my dear fellow. No
Barrymore would ever allow such a conventional thing to happen to him," John Barrymore, actor,
died 1942, LAURA WARD, FAMOUS LAST WORDS: THE ULTIMATE COLLECTION OF FINALES AND
FAREWELLS 44 (PRC Publ'g 2004); "Go away. I'm all right," H.G. Wells, novelist, died 1946, id. at 15.
89. See ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 20-21 (1973) (discussing people's evasion of
their own mortality).
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society, the requirement still exists, and is less likely to be fulfilled where
death is largely a stranger, relegated to hospitals or old age homes.9°
Finally, when one focuses on dying declarations made by spouses, it
is interesting to examine what choices the killer spouse felt he or she had
to end a bad relationship. In modern America, divorce is easy to pro-
cure.91 No-fault divorce did not exist until the 1970s,9 and murder might
have seemed like the only option to some unhappy spouses.
D. Critiques of Dying Declarations
Critiques of the dying declaration were expressed even in the nine-
teenth century. In a state court case of the same vintage as Mattox I and
II, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard argument about a dying declara-
tion. The defense pointed out that "[t]his kind of evidence is not re-
garded with favor." 93 In one persuasive (if run-on) sentence, the defense
argued strongly against the reliability of dying declaration:
Physical or mental weakness consequent upon the approach of
death, a desire of self-vindication, or a disposition to impute the re-
sponsibility for a wrong to another, as well as the fact that the dec-
larations are made in the absence of the accused, and often in re-
sponse to leading questions and direct suggestions, and with no
opportunity for cross-examination: all these considerations conspire
to render such declarations a dangerous kind of evidence.94
As the Supreme Court of the United States stated in Carver II, "[a] dying
declaration by no means imports absolute verity." 95 Carver II proceeded
to explain that the "history of criminal trials is replete with instances
where witnesses, even in the agonies of death, have through malice, mis-
apprehension or weakness of mind made declarations that were inconsis-
tent with the actual facts." 96 And as the New York Court of Appeals ex-
plained: "Dying declarations are dangerous, because [they are] made
with no fear of prosecution for perjury. '
90. See Digital History, supra note 87 ("Twentieth century Americans rarely have to directly
confront the facts of mortality. Death in our society is largely confined to the elderly and most deaths
take place not in homes but in hospitals. Professionals - doctors, nurses, and morticians - handle the
dying and dead.").
91. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR.
L. REv. 649, 651 (1984) (discussing the rarity of divorce filings in early American history).
92. See LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM & JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 310 (3d ed.
2005) (discussing the widespread adoption of no-fault divorce in the United States); Lynn D. Wardle,
No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REv. 79, 82-91 (1991) (discussing the
history of adoption of no-fault divorce laws).
93. State v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299, 303 (1877).
94. Id.
95. Carver 1I, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1897).
96. Id.
97. People v. Falletto, 96 N.E. 355, 357 (N.Y. 1911).
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An Oklahoma appellate court from 1908 compared the dying decla-
ration unfavorably to spontaneous statements.98 It acknowledged the ne-
cessity argument for dying declarations, but observed that: "Experience
teaches us that men do not always speak the truth in the presence of cer-
tain death. There may be, and often is, premeditation in connection with
a dying declaration. This opens the way to fabrication. '" 9
Similarly, it is not hard to find scholarly derision of the dying decla-
ration. °° Modern scholars do not question the historical pedigree of the
dying declaration, but do challenge its wisdom."' As with the older cas-
es, scholars' critiques of the dying declaration concern its accuracy, and
are alluded to in Moody's comment about an "irritated mind" ' and in
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's discussion of "[p]hysical or mental
weakness consequent upon the approach of death."'0 3 Assuming arguen-
do that knowledge of the imminence of one's death encourages honesty,
there may still be problems with perception, which tends to plummet
when one is bleeding to death.'04 The problem is not only of physical ca-
pacity and blood loss, but the effect of stress on perception and memory
as well.05
98. See Price v. State, 98 P. 447, 454 (Okla. Crim. App. 1908). Spontaneous statements were
deemed more reliable by the court because the lack of calculation rendered them more sincere and
less likely to be fabricated. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation
Clause, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (1987) (arguing that dying declarations are unreliable); Leonard R. Jaffee,
The Constitution and Proof by Dead or Unconfrontable Declarants, 33 ARK. L. REV. 227, 363 (1979)
(arguing that the dying declaration exception should not be kept merely because of its long, inflexible
history); Bryan A. Liang, Shortcuts to "Truth ": The Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 229,230-43 (1998) (advocating for eliminating the dying declaration exception and cit-
ing scientific evidence indicating the unreliability of dying declarations); Polelle, supra note 3, at 289
(arguing that there is no longer any justification for the dying declaration exception); Charles W.
Ouick, Some Reflections on Dying Declarations, 6 How. L.J. 109, 109 (1960) (describing the dying dec-
laration exception as being full of illogicalities and absurdities); Comment, The Admissibility of Dying
Declarations, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 509 (1970) (discussing the rationale behind dying declarations
and arguing that this rationale no longer has any foundation); Note, Dying Declarations, 46 IOWA L.
REV. 375, 375-87 (1961) (discussing weaknesses of dying declarations and how they are countered by
the required elements as well as the limiting factors applied by the courts, including jury instructions,
and also recommending lifting some of the limitations, including its application only to criminal homi-
cide cases and its scope being limited to facts and circumstances of death).
101. See sources cited supra note 100.
102. State v. Moody, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 50,50 (1798).
103. State v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299, 303 (1877).
104. See Wilbur Larremore, Dying Declarations, 41 AM. L. REV. 660, 660 (1907) ("[A] person
whose dying declaration is offered was usually very unfavorably circumstanced for fairly apprehending
the facts."); Polelle, supra note 3, at 302-03 (discussing the effects of trauma and blood loss on people
making dying declarations).
105. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1374 (1985) ("Pain, catastrophic physical calamity, and anguish may
characterize the circumstances under which a declarant makes such statements. Perception, memory,
comprehension, and clarity of expression are likely to be impaired."); Note, supra note 100, at 376
(The "declarant's physical and mental state of mind at the moment of death may weaken the reliability
of his statements."). For a general discussion of the effect of stress on memory and perception, see
Aviva Orenstein, "MY GOD!": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 180-82 (1997).
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Mostly, however, the modern scholarly critique focuses on the reli-
gious underpinnings of the dying declaration exception. It is the reliance
on a constricted religious belief in heaven's reward and hell's punishment
as the guarantor of reliability that is chiefly questioned in modern
times.1°6 Western religious attitudes upon which the exception depends
have arguably lost their sway."° Moreover, there is no attempt to ascer-
tain the belief system of the declarant.10 Without the belief in eternal
damnation, the main guarantor of trustworthiness is gone.
Many believe that the dying declaration exception reflects the worst
of the categorical thinking and legal fiction that riddles evidence law.
The best thing one can say for the dying declaration exception is that it
mirrors our entire system of procedural truth. Arguably, evidence rules
have nothing to do with accuracy, but their byzantine and formal nature
shields us from that very fact, and from the greater insight that objective
truth is unattainable. 1°9
E. Justifications for the Dying Declaration Exception
So, if no one actually believes the reasons for dying declarations,
what are the justifications for maintaining this ancient, arguably out-of-
date, and unreliable evidentiary exception as one of the only ways to
admit statements of unconfronted witnesses? Outside of the religious
explanation, there are five potential reasons, four of which are tradition-
al, one of which I suggest is a modern rethinking of the dying declaration.
A variation on the theme of fear of divine punishment is the futility
of declarants' lying right before they have "shuffl[e]d off this mortal
coil."110 As the declarant slips away, he becomes disengaged with life on
earth. This is reflected in the passage from King John that serves as the
There are other objections as well, including the fact that courts tend to tolerate leading questions
from police and others trying to generate evidence. See Polelle, supra note 3, at 303-04; see, e.g.,
People v. Callaghan, 6 P. 49, 56 (Utah 1885) ("In the enfeebled state in which the deceased then was,
and the difficulty in obtaining answers, there was no ground for excluding the declarations because
they were answers to leading questions.").
106. See, e.g., Liang, supra note 100, at 237-38 (explaining the possibility that not all dying decla-
rants may be influenced by the "'threat' of divine punishment").
107. See id. at 238 & n.34.
108. Id. at 235 n.19; cf. State v. Yee Gueng, 112 P. 424, 425 (Or. 1910) (holding that there was no
error in refusing requested jury instruction that dying person's lack of belief in future rewards or pu-
nishments might be considered in assessing credibility of dying declaration).
109. Desmond Manderson makes this point elegantly. Manderson, supra note 22, at 1638. He
notes the role of formalism in protecting law from scrutiny: "A formal legal system conceals its origins
and values behind an insistence on procedural requirements and supposed 'bright-line rules.' It does
so in order to render impossible any substantive challenge to its legitimacy by pretending to an objec-
tivity which is mythic." Id. at 1638 (citation omitted). Therefore, according to Manderson, "It is not
the truth of evidence given under oath which maintains the legitimacy of the legal system, but the ri-
tual incantation of formulae which reinscribe and reinforce the unchallengeable authority of the rules
laid down." Id. at 1642; see also Nesson, supra note 105, at 1357-59 (explaining that the need to pro-
mote public acceptance of verdicts, rather than search for truth, can better explain many evidentiary
rules and other aspects of the trial process).
110. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1, 1. 67.
No. 51 1427
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prooftext for Woodcock: "What in the world should make me now de-
ceive, [s]ince I must lose the use of all deceit?""' Basically, lying is point-
less and cannot benefit the person soon to depart this world. The prob-
lem with this justification is that people who are dying place great stock
in leaving order and justice behind after death. That is why people make
last wills and testaments. That is why people write final letters to family
or create ethical wills. That is why famous people's last words matter."2
So, the disengagement theory is a weak one, and we still have concerns
about malice and vengeance leading to false statements."
3
A second justification for the dying declaration revolves around ne-
cessity. Traditionally, advocates of dying declarations asserted that the
fear of heaven rendered dying declarations particularly trustworthy;
however, that quality alone would have been insufficient. There are
many forms of reliable, highly trustworthy hearsay statements that are
not admissible. Paired with reliability is another key justification for ad-
mission: a strong need for the statement. By definition, those who make
dying declarations are not around to be cross-examined later. These dec-
larants frequently possess vital information."4
Courts have often emphasized this factor of necessity, but they
clearly do not feel entirely comfortable with it. The Supreme Court in
Mattox I observed that in addition to the reliability of dying declarations,
"[tihe admission of the testimony is justified upon the ground of necessi-
ty."" 5 Mattox II continued this theme, emphasizing the flexibility of the
Sixth Amendment and the importance of securing convictions. 116  In
Carver II, the Court observed that "[d]ying declarations are a marked
exception to the general rule that hearsay testimony is not admissible,
and are received from the necessities of the case and to prevent an entire
failure of justice, as it frequently happens that no other witnesses to the
homicide are present."'" 7
The problem with the necessity argument is that it proves too much.
If necessity were the only criterion, a woman's statement to police weeks
before she was allegedly murdered by her lover would always be admiss-
ible. Necessity is clearly a factor, but it cannot by itself be an explanation
111. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING JOHN, act 4, sc. 5, 11. 26-27; see supra note 18.
112. Hence, the famous last words of Francisco "Pancho" Villa, (1878-1923): "Don't let it end
like this. Tell them I said something." WARD, supra note 88, at 92.
113. See Jaffee, supra note 100, at 228-33, 334-35, 340-41 (arguing that the dying declaration ex-
ception should not be preserved merely because of its long history, reviewing psychological disorders
suffered by a percentage of the population, and citing to a survey indicating that, at least with respect
to people they hate, some dying declarants will lie).
114. See Comment, supra note 100, at 375.
115. Matuox 1, 146 U.S. 140,152 (1892).
116. Mattox II, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
117. Carver 11, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1897); see also Foley v. State, 72 P. 627, 629 (Wyo. 1903) ("[I]n
view of the fact that in many cases there are no eyewitnesses to the murder except the slayer and the
deceased, they are made an exception to the rule, and admitted upon the ground of necessity.").
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for admission without eviscerating the hearsay rule and right to confront
witnesses.
A third justification (directly in conflict with my first explanation of
disengagement) is that dying words matter to people for reasons of inte-
grity and solemnity. One does not have to believe in a deity or an after-
life to see death as presenting a moment of moral seriousness and clarity.
This is a position advanced by Wigmore 1s and acknowledged by the ad-
visory committee notes to the Federal Rules, which observes that
"[w]hile the original religious justification for the [dying declaration] ex-
ception may have lost its conviction for some persons over the years, it
can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures are
present."119
A fourth justification is one of quasi-forfeiture. The reason the ac-
cused cannot confront the declarant is that the declarant is dead. The
reason the declarant is dead is because the accused allegedly killed him,
and now has the chutzpah20 to demand a live witness to cross-examine.1
The problem with this broad view of forfeiture is that it ignores the pre-
sumption of innocence. Any accusation of homicide would trigger the
forfeiture of rights, and voices from the grave, unsusceptible to confron-
tation, would be ushered into the trial process. 2
A final justification-and, as we will see, the only one relied on by
Justice Scalia in Crawford-is purely historical. We admit dying declara-
118. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 1438-43, at 289-303. "Even without such a belief [in divine
punishment], there is a natural and instinctive awe at the approach of an unknown future-a physical
revulsion common to all men, irresistible, and independent of theological belief." Id. § 1443, at 302.
119. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
120. Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, The Evolution of Chutzpah as a Legal Term: The Chutzpah
Championship, Chutzpah Award, Chutzpah Doctrine, and Now, The Supreme Court, 87 KY. L.J. 417,
418 (1999) (noting Leo Rosten's definition of "chutzpah" in The Joys of Yiddish, as "'gall, brazen
nerve, effrontery,"' and opining that the translation does not "fully capture[] the audacity simulta-
neously bordering on insult and humor which the word 'chutzpah' connotes").
121. See Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford- High Court Decision Restores Confronta-
tion Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4, 12 (2004) ("[I]f a defendant renders a witness unavailable by
wrongful means, the accused cannot complain validly about the witness's absence at trial.").
122. It is for this reason, among others, that the Supreme Court in Giles v. California rejected a
sweeping forfeiture theory in murder cases. See 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008); infra Part II.B. Justice Souter
explained the unfair circularity of forfeiting the right to confrontation based on an accusation of homi-
cide alone:
If the victim's prior statement were admissible solely because the defendant kept the witness out
of court by committing homicide, admissibility of the victim's statement to prove guilt would turn
on finding the defendant guilty of the homicidal act causing the absence; evidence that the defen-
dant killed would come in because the defendant probably killed. The only thing saving admissi-
bility and liability determinations from question begging would be (in a jury case) the distinct
functions of judge and jury: judges would find by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant
killed (and so would admit the testimonial statement), while the jury could so find only on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Equity demands something more than this near circularity before
the right to confrontation is forfeited, and more is supplied by showing intent to prevent the wit-
ness from testifying.
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part); see also Polelle, supra note 3, at 308 ("The ar-
gument for automatic forfeiture is essentially circular. It assumes that homicide defendants have
committed the very crime of which they stand accused before they have been found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
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tions because our Founding Fathers, the authors of the Sixth Amend-
ment, clearly did so.123  Citing Mattox I, the Court in Kirby v. United
States explained in dicta the necessity justification, and mentioned the
dying declaration's historical pedigree:
It is scarcely necessary to say that to the rule that an accused is
entitled to be confronted with witnesses against him the admission
of dying declarations is an exception which arises from the necessity
of the case. This exception was well established before the adop-
tion of the Constitution, and was not intended to be abrogated . 24
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW APPROACH TO CONFRONTATION
Since 2004, four major Supreme Court cases have reshaped our un-
derstanding of the applicability and protections offered by the right to
confront witnesses."' The first case, which charted the Court's path-
breaking reinterpretation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause, is Crawford v. Washington . 6  Crawford held that if an out-of-
court "testimonial" statement is introduced against the accused, the dec-
larant must be: (1) available for cross-examination; or (2) unavailable,
and the prior testimonial statement was subject to cross-examination by
the accused on a previous occasion."7
123. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
124. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899) (requiring confrontation and noting the excep-
tion presented by dying declarations) (citing Mattox I, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892)).
125. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678;
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
126. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
127. Id. at 59 ("Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only
where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine."). The Court recently restated its Crawford holding:
In Crawford, after reviewing the Clause's historical underpinnings, we held that it guarantees a
defendant's right to confront those "who 'bear testimony' against him. A witness's testimony
against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is un-
available, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531 (citations omitted).
Tom Lininger has explained that post-Crawford the prosecution has three options for satisfying the
Confrontation Clause if it wishes to admit testimonial statements:
(1) produce the declarant for cross-examination; (2) prove that the accused has forfeited his right
of confrontation by wrongfully procuring the absence of the declarant; or (3) offer the evidence
pursuant to the hearsay exception for dying declarations, which prosecutors had used to admit
testimonial hearsay back in 1791 when the Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment.
Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271,278 (2006) (citations
omitted).
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A. Crawford and the Focus on Testimonial Statements
The facts of Crawford involved a criminal defendant who was argu-
ably avenging the attempted rape of his wife, Sylvia Crawford. 128 The
prosecution wanted to admit Sylvia's statement to police at the station-
house because it cast some doubt on whether the victim had a knife, un-
dermining her husband's claim that he had killed in self-defense . 29 The
trial court admitted Sylvia's statement because it found that the state-
ment was trustworthy, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. 130
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Sylvia Craw-
ford's statement was "testimonial" and its admission violated the Con-
frontation Clause.13'
The Court's focus on "testimonial" statements in Crawford
represented an entirely new approach to confrontation. Previous con-
frontation jurisprudence, set out in Ohio v. Roberts,3 2 emphasized relia-
bility. According to Roberts, out-of-court statements could be used if
they bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability.1 3  This test was satisfied if
the out-of-court statement fell within firmly rooted hearsay exceptions or
otherwise demonstrated particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.?3
Roberts had essentially collapsed the standards for hearsay and confron-
tation.
Crawford rejected the focus on reliability and explicitly overruled
Roberts, criticizing it because it did not protect core constitutional values:
"The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adver-
sary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability. It thus
replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability
with a wholly foreign one. ' 135 Crawford explained that the focus on re-
liability was flawed: "To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliabili-
ty be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination."'36  The Court also faulted Roberts because it was
"amorphous"'37 and unpredictable in its application. As Crawford em-
128. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. It is probably coincidental that the accused in the case seemed
more righteous than most criminal defendants, but this fact may have made the opinion's pro-
defendant slant easier to take for some of the law-and-order types on the Court.
129. See id. at 38-39. Sylvia had given a statement to the police at the police station that arguably
fell within the State of Washington's hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest. See
WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2006). Although in-court testimony was covered by the marital testimonial
privilege, the stationhouse statement by Sylvia Crawford was not. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
130. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.
131. Id. at 36.
132. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
133. Id. at 66.
134. Id.
135. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
136. Id. at 61.
137. See id. at 63 ("Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.").
No. 51
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phasized, the "unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its
unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.1138
Justice Scalia, author of the Crawford majority, was emphatic that
"[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Fra-
mers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of
the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 'reliability."' 39
A key question then arose: what constitutes a "testimonial state-
ment"? The Court offered various, noncomprehensive definitions of this
crucial term.40 Crawford emphasized the intentions of the declarant and
whether the speaker could reasonably expect the statement he was mak-
ing to be used in a future legal proceeding against the person impli-
cated. 4 ' As many commentators have noted, however, Crawford offered
very little concrete guidance as to the crucial term "testimonial." '42 The
Court itself noted that "[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out
a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' '1 43  As Chief Justice Rehn-
quist predicted in his concurrence in the judgment, the immediate effect
of Crawford was immense confusion as to what sorts of statements were
"testimonial."1"4
138. Id.
139. Id. at 61. Crawford found the Roberts approach both overinclusive in applying the Confron-
tation Clause to nontestimonial statements and underinclusive in applying a subjective reliability test
as a substitute for the clear congressional command of confrontation. Id. at 60-61. The Roberts test
was too broad because Roberts "applies the same mode of analysis whether or not the hearsay consists
of ex parte testimony. This often results in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed
from the core concerns of the Clause." Id. at 60. Crawford observed that "not all hearsay implicates
the Sixth Amendment's core concerns. An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence
and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to the civil-
law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted." Id. at 51. On the other hand, the Roberts approach
was too narrow because "[ilt admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere find-
ing of reliability. This malleable standard often fails to protect against paradigmatic confrontation
violations." Id. at 60.
140. The Court explained:
Various formulations of this core class of 'testimonial' statements exist: 'ex parte in-court testi-
mony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that decla-
rants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,'... 'extrajudicial statements ... contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes-
sions,'... 'statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness rea-
sonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial[.]'... These formula-
tions all share a common nucleus and then define the Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction
around it. Regardless of the precise articulation, some statements qualify under any definition-for
example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing.
Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 52.
142. See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Amending the Hearsay Exception for Declarations Against Penal
Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2409, 2417-18 (2005); Tom Lininger, Yes, Vir-
ginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 401,402 (2005); Brian Fox, Note, Crawford
at Its Limits: Hearsay and Forfeiture in Child Abuse Cases, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1245,1248-50 (2009).
143. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
144. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed:
The Court grandly declares that "[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehen-
sive definition of 'testimonial[.]"' But the thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thou-
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Since Crawford, various lower courts have struggled with the defini-
tion of "testimonial" and have focused on different aspects of Crawford.
They have alternatively relied on whether the declarant initiated contact
with law enforcement authorities, the location of the interaction between
the declarant and law enforcement agents, the structure and formality of
the questioning, the declarant's purpose for making the statements, and
the law enforcement agents' intent during the interaction. 145
Of the many questions Crawford left open in its failure to set out
what counts as "testimonial," among the hardest issues posed by the new
jurisprudence are those that arise in domestic violence cases. Prosecu-
tors' reliance on victims' prior statements reflects the fact that victims of
intimate violence often recant or refuse to testify. Before Crawford,
many jurisdictions had a "no drop" or victimless prosecution policy that
depended on the admissibility of the victim's out-of-court-statements,
146
but such statements, at least those made to police or other law enforce-
ment personnel, arguably fall within the definition of "testimonial" and
cannot be admitted unless the victim testifies.
B. Refinement of the Crawford Standard: Davis, Giles, and Melendez-
Diaz
The issue of the testimonial quality of statements made by domestic
violence victims to police was squarely addressed by the Court in Davis
v. Washington two years after Crawford. 47 Davis involved two cases, one
from the state of Washington' and a companion case, Hammon v. Indi-
sands of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of "testimony" the
Court lists, is covered by the new rule. They need them now, not months or years from now.
Rules of criminal evidence are applied every day in courts throughout the country, and parties
should not be left in the dark in this manner.
Id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
145. See Gary M. Bishop, Testimonial Statements, Excited Utterances and the Confrontation
Clause: Formulating a Precise Rule After Crawford and Davis, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 568-69
(2006); Josephine Ross, Crawford's Short-Lived Revolution: How Davis v. Washington Reins in Craw-
ford's Reach, 83 N.D. L. REV. 387, 393-400 (2007) ("[R]eaders of Crawford should not assume that
there is only one core definition of testimonial.").
146. See Myrna S. Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's Impact on
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 327 (2005).
147. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
148. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005). State v. Davis involved a 911 emergency call
placed by a victim during a domestic disturbance with her former boyfriend, Davis. During the call,
the 911 operator learned that Davis had just run out the door after hitting the victim. The operator
asked numerous questions, including Davis's full name, birthday, his purpose for visiting the victim's
residence, and the context of the assault. Davis, 547 U.S. at 818. Upon arrival, the police observed the
victim's "shaken state," fresh injuries on her body, and frantic efforts to grab her belongings and leave
the residence along with her children. Id. Because the victim was unavailable at Davis's trial, the
State's only witnesses were the two responding officers. Id. Over Davis's objections, the trial court
admitted the recording of the victim's 911 call, and convicted Davis of a felony violation of a domestic
no-contact order. Id. at 819. The Washington Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton affirmed, concluding that the portions of the 911 call in which the victim identified Davis were
nontestimonial. See Davis, 111 P.3d at 852; State v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661,669 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
No. 5]
HeinOnline -- 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1433 2010
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
ana.149 These cases required the Court "to determine when statements
made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene
are 'testimonial' and thus subject to the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause.""15 In neither case did the decla-
rant appear at trial to testify; in both, the state courts admitted state-
ments made out of court to 911 operators or police. The Court acknowl-
edged that it had to refine its definition of "testimonial statements" and
"determine more precisely which police interrogations produce testimo-
ny.151
Again eschewing any efforts to "produce an exhaustive classifica-
tion of all conceivable statements,' '5 2 the Court attempted to differen-
tiate testimonial from nontestimonial statements. According to the
Court in Davis, nontestimonial statements are "made in the course of po-
lice interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency." ''"3 Statements are testimonial, however,
"when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongo-
ing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prose-
cution.' '1 4 The Court also recognized the level of formality as a factor in
determining whether a statement is testimonial. It contrasted the calm,
formal police station statement of Crawford with the frantic impromptu
nature of the 911 call in Davis.5' The Court noted, however, that once
the declarant started answering specific questions posed by the operator
149. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). Hammon involved statements made to law enforcement person-
nel while they responded to a reported domestic disturbance at the Hammon home. When the officers
arrived they found the victim on the porch appearing "somewhat frightened," even though she said
nothing was wrong. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819. She allowed the police to enter her home, where they
found evidence of a struggle in the living room and the accused in the kitchen. Id. The officers sepa-
rated the victim and the accused and again asked the victim what had occurred. Id. Though the ac-
cused attempted to interrupt, the victim eventually described the domestic disturbance and filled out
and signed a battery affidavit. Id. at 820. She did not appear at trial and the State called the officer
who questioned her to describe what she told him and authenticate the affidavit. Id. Over the ac-
cused's objections, the trial court admitted the victim's affidavit as a present sense impression and the
victim's statements as excited utterances. Id. The trial judge found Hammon guilty of domestic bat-
tery; both the Indiana Court of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the
victim's oral statements were nontestimonial. Id. at 821. The courts agreed that the victim's affidavit
was testimonial but that its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hammon, 829
N.E.2d at 459; Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945,948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
150. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.
151. Id. at 822.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 827 ("[Tihe difference in the level of formality between the two interviews [in Davis
and Crawford] is striking.").
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regarding non-emergency matters, that part of the interview became a
testimonial statement.'56
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, argued that the line the majority tried
to establish between emergencies and the reporting of past events was
unsound and unworkable because it relies on motives.5 7 Instead, he ad-
vocated for an even narrower definition requiring a formal police inter-
rogation to trigger the "testimonial" status. '58
The Court acknowledged that domestic violence is a "type of crime
[that] is notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim
to ensure that she does not testify at trial,"'159 noting that in cases where
the accused makes the declarant unavailable through intimidation or
other means, forfeiture of the confrontation right is an option.
60
Just as Davis addressed a question left open in Crawford, Giles v.
California161 addressed the issue of forfeiture mentioned, but not deli-
neated, in Davis.162 The notion of forfeiting the right of confrontation-
for instance, an accused who provides concrete overshoes for a witness to
prevent him from testifying-has a longstanding history going back to
old English case law and the American case of Reynolds v. United
States.1
63
In Giles, the Court addressed whether by murdering someone-not
with the intent to keep the person quiet per se but simply because the ac-
cused happened to want the person dead-the accused forfeited his con-
frontation rights concerning the victim's prior statements. The case in-
volved a charge of murder and a claim of self-defense by the accused.
16
The victim had no weapon, suffered some defensive wounds, and was
shot while the defendant closed his eyes. 165
The evidentiary question involved the admission of statements that
the victim, Brenda Avie, made to police at the scene of a domestic vi-
olence call, weeks before the killing."6 She reported the accused's physi-
156. Id. at 828-29. The 911 call involved spontaneous statements by the declarant as well as an-
swers to questions regarding the alleged perpetrator's date of birth, preceded by the injunction from
the 911 operator to "[sltop talking and answer my questions." Id. at 818.
157. Id. at 839-42 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Many
academics agree with Justice Thomas's assessment. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence:
Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REv. 857, 881-82 (2009); Myrna
S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?, 15 J.L. &
POL'Y 759, 762 (2007).
158. Davis, 547 U.S. at 836-37.
159. Id. at 832-33 (majority opinion).
160. Id. at 833.
161. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
162. 547 U.S. at 833 ("We take no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfei-
ture .... ").
163. 98 U.S. 145, 148-50, 158-61 (1879) (admitting former testimony of wife after accused had
kept her away from home so that she could not be subpoenaed to testify).
164. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681.
165. Id. at 2681-82.
166. Id. at 2681.
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cal abuse and murderous threats.'67 The issue was not raised at trial, and
the Justices assumed that the victim's statements to the police were tes-
timonial. 168 In Giles, the issue was whether by killing the victim, the ac-
cused forfeited his right to confront her regarding those statements. Re-
viewing old common-law cases, the Court ruled that to fall within the
forfeiture doctrine, the accused had to intend to procure the declarant's
absence to prevent him or her from testifying. 169 Without such intent,
there is no forfeiture. Otherwise, every murder case could automatically
open the door for former testimonial statements of the declarant under a
forfeiture theory, thereby undermining the confrontation right. 70 To do
so would ignore the intent requirement and would allow preliminary
judicial determinations of ultimate guilt to vitiate a constitutional protec-
tion.7 ' As a central part of his historical argument, Justice Scalia ob-
served that arguments over the application of dying declarations seem
pointless if every prior statement by a homicide victim is automatically
admissible under a forfeiture theory.1 72
The Court was particularly adamant that public policy could not vi-
tiate the constitutional command, and it rejected the creation of "excep-
tions that [the Court] thinks consistent with the policies underlying the
confrontation guarantee, regardless of how that guarantee was historical-
ly understood.' 1 73  Giles rejected an appeal to the forfeiture doctrine's
purposes and objectives as a not-so-well disguised attempt to return to
the world of the Roberts indicia-of-reliability test. 74  Apparently, the
worst criticism Scalia could hurl at a dissenting argument was that the au-
thor was a secret Roberts lover who did not fully understand that the Ro-
berts focus on reliability and policy was entirely pass6.
Giles again emphasized the categorical nature of the confrontation
right and observed in chiding the dissent that "the guarantee of confron-
tation is no guarantee at all if it is subject to whatever exceptions courts
from time to time consider 'fair." ' t75 The Court explained its categorical
rather than reason-based approach: "It is not the role of courts to extra-
polate from the words of the Sixth Amendment to the values behind it,
and then to enforce its guarantees only to the extent they serve (in the
courts' views) those underlying values. '176 The Court argued that such
167. Id. at 2681-82.
168. See id. at 2682.
169. Id. at 2683-84.
170. See id.
171. "The notion that judges may strip the defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essen-
tial to a fair trial, on the basis of a prior judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged,
does not sit well with the right to trial by jury." Id. at 2686. The Court referred to the fact that in or-
der to trigger a finding of forfeiture, the judge must make a preliminary finding by a preponderance of
the evidence that the accused killed the victim and hence forfeited his confrontation right.
172. See id. at 2686.
173. Id. at 2691.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2692.
176. Id.
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policy rationale missed the point of a historical constitutional protection:
"The Sixth Amendment seeks fairness indeed-but seeks it through very
specific means (one of which is confrontation) that were the trial rights of
Englishmen." '77
The majority was positively disdainful of a suggestion it attributed
to the dissent, that "a forfeiture rule which ignores Crawford would be
particularly helpful to women in abusive relationships-or at least par-
ticularly helpful in punishing their abusers."'78 The Court observed that
many statements of murder victims are not testimonial (in other words,
they are made to friends, doctors, etc.) 79 More importantly, the majority
expressed something close to outrage at the suggestion that domestic vi-
olence cases be treated differently:
In any event, we are puzzled by the dissent's decision to devote its
peroration to domestic abuse cases. Is the suggestion that we
should have one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers
adopted and Crawford described) for all other crimes, but a special,
improvised, Confrontation Clause for those crimes that are fre-
quently directed against women? 18
The last of the confrontation cases, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu-
setts,"' held that the prosecution's admission of a lab analyst's affidavit
that a substance was cocaine violated the accused's right to confrontation
because the accused could not cross-examine the lab analyst who was
never called as a witness by the government. 182 The Court found that the
lab report fell within the "core class of testimonial statements,' 1 83 even
though in some respects lab reports resemble business records that are
generally nontestimonial. 84 According to Scalia, the case presented a
"rather straightforward application of our holding in Crawford,"'' 8 trig-
gering the strict confrontation right.
The appeal to neutral science as objective and reliable struck the
majority as a return to Roberts-type reliability thinking. As in Giles, ac-
cusing the dissent of a covert return to Roberts is tantamount to accusing
it of confusion, or even worse, subversion of the Constitution. 86 Besides,
the Court observed that government forensic laboratories are not im-
mune from pressure or bias, and the confrontation right "is designed to
177. Id.
178. Id. To be fair, the dissent reads forfeiture more broadly but never intended to dispense with
Crawford. See id. at 2696 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2692-93 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 2693. This portion of the majority opinion was not joined by Justices Souter or Gins-
burg.
181. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
182. Id. at 2532.
183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Id. at 2538.
185. Id. at 2533.
186. See id. at 2536.
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weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as
well."'87
The majority was unswayed by predictions of the practical effect of
its rulings on the prosecution of cases. It rejected the prediction that the
confrontation requirement would be burdensome, noting that many
states already have such requirements and that strategically, "[i]t is un-
likely that defense counsel will insist on live testimony whose effect will
be merely to highlight rather than cast doubt upon the forensic analy-
sis."' Ultimately, even if the holding in Melendez-Diaz is burdensome,
the Court concluded it did not have the authority to relax the right of
confrontation, and consequentially, like the jury right and the privilege
against self-incrimination, that makes the prosecutor's job harder and
more complicated.
89
The dissent in Melendez-Diaz presented a global critique of where
Crawford and its progeny have led the court. 190 The dissent sarcastically
noted that "[w]e learn now that we have misinterpreted the Confronta-
tion Clause-hardly an arcane or seldom-used provision of the Constitu-
tion-for the first 218 years of its existence."' 91 The dissent also por-
trayed the entire Crawford jurisprudence as devolving into a "body of
formalistic and wooden rules, divorced from precedent, common sense,
and the underlying purpose of the Clause." At another juncture, the
dissent remarked that the Court was "driven by nothing more than a
wooden application of the Crawford and Davis definition of 'testimoni-
al,"' and had abandoned "any guidance from history, precedent, or
common sense."'193 It censured the majority's "formalistic and pointless"
reading of the Clause.194
The new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, as laid out in Craw-
ford, Davis, Giles, and Melendez-Diaz, has been justly criticized for its
lack of guidance on what constitutes "testimonial" statements and its fo-
cus on motive, which is always difficult to ascertain. 95 Both the defini-
tion of testimonial statements and of forfeiture rely on slippery notions
187. Id. at 2537.
188. Id. at 2542. The Court also made a less persuasive argument that defense attorneys would
not raise Crawford issues in order to avoid irritating the judge. The dissent rightfully mocked that ar-
gument as entirely at odds with defense counsel's ethical and professional obligations. Id. at 2556-57
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2540 (majority opinion).
190. The dissent failed to convince the majority of "the real differences between laboratory ana-
lysts who perform scientific tests and other, more conventional witnesses," or that laboratory analysts
are not witnesses against the accused within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 2543 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting), It justly criticized the majority for not clarifying who, among the many scientists,
technicians, and engineers who generate a positive-for-cocaine result, must be available for confronta-
tion. Id. at 2544-46.
191. Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 2544.
193. Id. at 2547.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 2548-49 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); supra notes 142,157 and accompanying text.
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of intent, which seems like an odd way to enforce a categorical constitu-
tional right.
Equally important, Justice Scalia has authored all four major con-
frontation decisions, thereby putting his personal imprint on the confron-
tation jurisprudence. The opinions are extremely long and heavy with
history. The tone is sometimes strident and it is clear that the Justice has
presented the confrontation right not only as an essentially misunder-
stood and neglected constitutional demand, but as a vehicle for espous-
ing his theory of constitutional interpretation generally. Four important
themes emerge from Justice Scalia's treatment of the confrontation cas-
es, all of which have important implications for future cases, particularly
those involving domestic violence. First is the indisputable focus on his-
tory and original practice of the Founders, spawning a cottage industry of
legal history on the subject.'96 Second is Scalia's affirmative, one might
almost say contemptuous, rejection of policy arguments or rationales in
justifying his interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. 197 Third, Scalia
rejects any appeals about the practicalities of prosecution; although he
will sometimes debate the real-world consequences of Crawford, he ul-
timately finds them irrelevant, and they cannot defeat what Scalia deter-
mined to be the meaning of the Sixth Amendment confrontation right.9 '
Finally, and closely related to the third point, Justice Scalia is positively
hostile to the suggestion that domestic violence cases should receive any
special treatment or consideration.1"
196. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It?
Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005); Anthony J. Franze,
The Confrontation Clause and Originalism: Lessons from King v. Brasier, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 495 (2007);
Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: "A Little Child
Shall Lead Them," 82 IND. L.J. 917 (2007).
197. Cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 869-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I have no need to
defend the value of confrontation, because the Court has no authority to question it."). Justice Sca-
lia's preference for rules rather than mushy policy-based standards is evident throughout his jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 623 (1990) (bemoaning the
"subjectivity, and hence inadequacy" of a "subjective assessment of what is fair and just" and advocat-
ing instead a reliance on tradition for assessing due process in personal jurisdiction).
198. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540-41 ("The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution
of criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause-like those other constitutional provisions-is
binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience."); cf. Craig, 497 U.S. at 864 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("The 'necessities of trial and the adversary process' are irrelevant here, since they cannot
alter the constitutional text.").
199. Justice Scalia's rejection of what he perceives to be special interest identity politics is evident
in his dissent in Craig, where he decried the "subordination of explicit constitutional text to currently
favored public policy." Craig, 497 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Craig, Justice Scalia opposed
special methods of confrontation to accommodate victims of child abuse and began his dissent with the
observation: "Seldom has this Court failed so conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee of the
Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion." Id. at 860.
No. 5] 1439
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C. Application of the New Confrontation Jurisprudence to Dying
Declarations
New life, or at least renewed interest, has been breathed into the dy-
ing declaration exception after the Supreme Court's recent reinterpreta-
tion of the Confrontation Clause. Dying declarations seem to be one of
only two exceptions to the rule announced in Crawford. (The other ex-
ception, forfeiture, is dealt with in Giles and is less of an exception than
an equitable principle of waiver -if one kills someone to silence him, one
cannot later complain that the witness is not there to cross-examine.)
One could challenge the wisdom of elevating this particular hearsay ex-
ception to the status of an exception of the confrontation right, but it is
very clear that dying declarations are treated specially.
Crawford opined that the
text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended ex-
ceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by
the courts. Rather, the 'right... to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him' is most naturally read as a reference to the right
of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions
established at the time of the founding.200
Crawford did indicate in a footnote that dying declarations might be an
exception to its newly announced rule: "The one deviation we have
found involves dying declarations. The existence of that exception as a
general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed."2 10 The Court
observed that it "need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amend-
ment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this
exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis. 202
Dicta in Giles would seem to settle the matter. Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Scalia explained,
two forms of testimonial statements were admitted at common law
even though they were unconfronted. The first of these were decla-
rations made by a speaker who was both on the brink of death and
aware that he was dying.... A second common-law doctrine, which
we will refer to as forfeiture by wrongdoing, permitted the introduc-
tion of statements of a witness who was "detained" or "kept away"
by the "means or procurement" of the defendant."'
Many dying declarations will be nontestimonial2 0° They will be dy-
ing statements made to family and friends and seem like precisely the
200. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,54 (2004) (citation omitted).
201. Id. at 56n.6.
202. Id.
203. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682-83 (2008) (citations omitted).
204. Post-Crawford, some courts have been able to avoid the issue of whether dying declarations
are an exception to the confrontation right by finding such statements nontestimonial, and hence not
covered by Crawford. See, e.g., People v. Ingram, 888 N.E.2d 520, 529 (I11. App. Ct. 2008) (holding
murder victim's statement to friend admissible as a dying declaration and nontestimonial); State v.
[Vol. 2010
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type of statements averred to in Giles as nontestimonial.20 5  There is
every reason to believe that courts, uncertain of the constitutional status
of testimonial dying declarations, will try to avoid the issue by finding
them nontestimonial or by finding that the statements do not meet the
strictures of dying declarations .2 1
Some dying declarations that are made to police or other first res-
ponders, however, will clearly fall within the definition of "testimonial."
With few exceptions, 2°7 courts post-Crawford have held that dying decla-
rations, even when they are testimonial, need not be confronted to be
admissible.2 8 Given the clarity of the Court's dicta and the imperative of
the originalist approach, it is safe to say that dying declarations will form
an exception to the rule announced in Crawford.209
Harper, 770 N.W.2d 316, 322 (Iowa 2009) (concluding that victim's statements to hospital staff were
admissible as dying declarations and were nontestimonial).
205. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692-93 ("[O]nly testimonial statements are excluded by the Confronta-
tion Clause. Statements to friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements to
physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules.").
206. James v. Marshall, No. CV 06-3399-CAS(E), 2008 WL 4601238, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13,
2008) ("This Court need not decide whether the hearsay exception for testimonial dying declarations
survive Crawford, because the record does not show that the victim's statement constituted a dying
declaration.").
207. See United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 964-66 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (considering and
rejecting admissibility of declarant's statement as a dying declaration because it was untrustworthy,
but allowing it under a forfeiture theory later repudiated by Giles); United States v. Jordan, No.
CRIM. 04-CR-229-B. 2005 WL 513501, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 3,2005) ("[T]here is no rationale in Craw-
ford or otherwise under which dying declarations should be treated differently than any other testi-
monial statement."). Jordan reaches this conclusion because it finds that "[wihether driven by reliabil-
ity or necessity or both, admission of a testimonial dying declaration after Crawford goes against the
sweeping prohibitions set forth in that case." Jordan, 2005 WL 513501, at *3. Jordan is not persuasive
because it states anomalously, "the dying declaration exception was not in existence at the time the
Framers designed the Bill of Rights." Id. at *3-4.
208. See, e.g., People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 972 (Cal. 2004) ("[T]he common law pedigree
of the exception for dying declarations poses no conflict with the Sixth Amendment."); Wallace v.
State, 836 N.E.2d 985, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("[W]e are convinced that Crawford neither explicitly,
nor impliedly, signaled that the dying declaration exception to hearsay ran afoul of an accused [sic]
right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment."); State v. Jones, 197 P.3d 815, 822 (Kan. 2008)
("[W]e are confident that, when given the opportunity to do so, the Supreme Court would confirm
that a dying declaration may be admitted into evidence, even when it is testimonial in nature and is
unconfronted."); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299, 310 (Mass. 2008) (noting that even if dec-
larant's statement had been testimonial, it would have been admissible as a dying declaration because
both Crawford, though leaving the question undecided, indicated that there is authority for admitting
them and Massachusetts law recognized dying declarations as an exception to the confrontation right);
State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578,585-86 (Minn. 2005) ("We hold that the admission into evidence of a
dying declaration does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation within the
meaning of Crawford because an exception for dying declarations existed at common law and was not
repudiated by the Sixth Amendment."); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 711 (Nev. 2006) ("[I]t follows
that because dying declarations were recognized at common law as an exception to the right of con-
frontation, they should continue to be recognized as an exception."); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136,
148 (Tenn. 2007) ("Because the admissibility of the dying declaration is also deeply entrenched in the
legal history of this state, it is also our view that this single hearsay exception survives the mandate of
Crawford regardless of its testimonial nature.").
209. Professor Nicolas makes this point persuasively, noting that "[in footnote six, the Court took
pains to point out that Crawford did not technically decide the issue of the admissibility of dying dec-
larations vis-h-vis the Confrontation Clause." Nicolas, supra note 11, at 491. Yet Nicolas documents
incidents in which dicta in Crawford (relating to forfeiture or to nontestimonial statements) were
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The elevation of the dying declaration to the status of one of only
two exceptions to Crawford's command understandably worries civil li-
bertarians who foresee prosecutors attempting to shoehorn all inculpato-
ry remarks of dead victims into the dying declaration exception. There is
a vigorous and active scholarship currently trying to narrow the defini-
tion of dying declarations to their common-law form and not the more
expanded versions adopted by the states."' Predictably, those worried
about the curtailment of prosecution, particularly of domestic violence
cases, have also latched onto the dying declaration as one of the few re-
maining vehicles for admitting testimony when the witness is not availa-
ble and was never cross-examined. Professor Lininger has recently ar-
gued for the expansion of dying declarations in light of Crawford, most
notably to include criminal charges other than homicides.2"
III. QUESTIONING CRA WFORD'S CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO
CONFRONTATION
Crawford ushered in a bold new approach to confrontation that has,
at the very least, the benefit of finally untangling hearsay and confronta-
tion. Unfortunately, though this new jurisprudence seems to finally take
the Sixth Amendment seriously, it resorts to fixed and unhelpful catego-
ries of questionable historical accuracy,"' devoid of any sensitivity to the
harm to the accused, the needs of victims, or the practicalities of prosecu-
tion. Crawford engages in analysis by pigeonhole, with an unnuanced
originalism and little respect for how the Confrontation Clause was de-
signed to operate. As a functional matter, Crawford is overinclusive in
that it protects out-of-court statements that would probably be outside
the purview of what the Founders ever dreamed of protecting, such as
the lab technician's report in Melendez-Diaz. Crawford is also arguably
underinclusive, however, in admitting nontestimonial statements at trial
without allowing the accused to confront the witnesses against him.2
adopted in later opinions. Id. at 492 ("[Tjhe Court's holding in Giles v. California four years later ef-
fectively assumes that a dying declaration exception to the Confrontation Clause exists." (citation
omitted)). Furthermore, the consistency and importance of the dicta is enhanced by the fact that Jus-
tice Scalia has authored every major confrontation case. See Thomas Y. Davies, Not "the Framers'
Design": How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis "Testi-
monial" Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 349, 351
(2007).
210. See generally Nicolas, supra note 11 (attempting to define dying declarations as a constitu-
tional matter as opposed to state law, and examining among other issues the requirements for unavail-
ability, the limitation to homicide cases, and the requirement that the declaration concern the circums-
tances of impending death).
211. Lininger, supra note 127, at 315-19.
212. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Davies's critique of Sca-
lia's originalism).
213. See Craig M. Bradley, Melendez-Diaz and the Right to Confrontation, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
315,315 (2010).
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Professor Thomas Davies has convincingly argued that Justice Sca-
lia's testimonial versus nontestimonial distinction does not accurately re-
flect the Founders' approach to confrontation."4 Davies demonstrates
how Scalia's approach is ahistorical and Crawford's approach to unsworn
hearsay is inconsistent with the basic premise that "hearsay was 'no evi-
dence, ' '211 which shaped the Framers' understanding of the confrontation
right.216
There is also a question whether the correct date for interpreting
original intent of the Confrontation Clause, at least when it is applied to
state cases,217 should be 1789, when the Sixth Amendment was ratified or
1868, the year the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted s. 2 1  This issue has
potentially serious consequences because the rules of evidence under-
went vast changes and the understanding of what constituted fair proce-
dure in criminal courts changed significantly with the expansion of vari-
ous exceptions to hearsay. 19
Even if Scalia were correct in his assessment of what the Founders
believed and practiced regarding confrontation, there are many reasons
to assail the originalist approach generally. Some argue that it is an im-
possible historical endeavor and that what the Founders believed is un-
knowable . 2  Beyond his historical critique, Davies concludes that origi-
nalism is a "fundamentally flawed approach to constitutional
interpretation in criminal procedure issues because originalists fail to
grasp-or to admit-the degree to which legal doctrine and legal institu-
214. See Thomas Y. Davies, Selective Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of Giles's Forfeiture
Exception to Confrontation Were or Were Not "Established at the Time of the Founding," 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 605, 605 (2009) (labeling Scalia's historical distinction between the treatment of testi-
monial and nontestimonial hearsay "completely fictional"). See generally Davies, supra note 209.
215. Davies, supra note 196, at 119.
216. See Davies, supra note 209, at 356 (explaining that Justice Scalia did not formulate an origi-
nalist claim based on common law but rather drew inferences).
217. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (first case applying the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation to the states).
218. See Nicolas, supra note 11, at 504 ("[O]ne may nonetheless have a quibble with Justice Sca-
lia's exclusive focus on the year 1791. After all, at issue in Crawford was the applicability of the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause not to an arm of the federal government, but rather to the State
of Washington. And of course, the Sixth Amendment does not apply of its own force to the states, but
rather only by means of 'incorporation' via the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citation omitted); Raeder,
supra note 146, at 311-12. But cf. Davies, supra note 196, at 117 ("[The correct date for the Framers
was 1789 because] the relevant outside date for assessing original meaning is the date when the text
was framed by the First Congress, not the date of ratification."); Randolph N. Jonakait, "Witnesses" in
the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP.
L. REV. 155, 188 (2006) (arguing that Mattox should not be persuasive authority because it came one
hundred years after the Founding and implying but not stating that close to 1791 is the correct date).
219. See Davies, supra note 209, at 456-57 ("[Jludges began to recognize new doctrinal hearsay
exceptions sometime during the first half of the nineteenth century--but well after the 1789 framing of
the Confrontation Clause.").
220. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Con-
frontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into [its]
intended scope....") (quoted in Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified
Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567,568 (1978)).
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tions have changed since the framing."' Others contend that originalist
analysis subverts the constitutional plan because the Framers intended
that the Constitution be interpreted as a living document and because
the expectations of the Founders cannot be grafted onto modern society
without leading to bad policy outcomes. 221 This last point is especially
important in the context of domestic violence cases in which, as Professor
Myrna Raeder observes, originalism is bound to silence voices that were
unheard in 1791, a time when society misunderstood and even condoned
domestic violence. 223
Even if correct historically, and even if one believes in originalism
as a legitimate form of constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia's ex-
ception for the dying declaration undermines the Court's entire original-
ist approach.
As the Mattox cases make clear, dying declarations were elevated to
a special status because they were deemed highly reliable and neces-
sary.224 That sort of analysis-a focus on reliability and necessity, per-
haps augmented by something of a notion of fairness and forfeiture-
reflects the thinking of the older cases. From the inception of the excep-
tion, the focus in applying and justifying dying declarations has been on
policy rationales.225 This was the understanding of dying declarations at
the time of the Founders,226 and at the time the right of confrontation was
incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states. 27
Ironically, however, such attention to reliability and need is precise-
ly the type of Roberts argument that Crawford excoriates and Justice
Scalia despises. 228 Historically, dying declarations were often procured by
221. Davies, supra note 209, at 355.
222. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (ar-
guing that originalism is "not merely false but pernicious" and explaining classic objections to this
form of constitutional interpretation).
223. See Raeder, supra note 146, at 311-14 (2005); see also Lininger, supra note 157, at 876-77
("The problem of domestic violence as understood in modem times-i.e., violence against intimate
partners-was virtually never the subject of criminal prosecutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Because the courts of that era did not address the uniquely coercive pressures that charac-
terize a battering relationship, authority from that era is inapposite .... ") (citation omitted). Profes-
sor Davies coined the term "selective originalism" whereby some aspects of the Founding Fathers'
legal world are credited and others ignored. See generally Davies, supra note 196.
224. Mattox II, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); Mattox 1, 146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892). I recognize that Mat-
tox is certainly later than the framing period, but there are three justifications for using this nine-
teenth-century case. First, the Court does not often opine on the dying declaration exception, and
Mattox offers important insights into how this exception interacts with the Confrontation Clause.
Second, there is a strong argument that the correct date for assessing the intent of the drafters for Con-
frontation Clause cases arising out of state criminal cases is the time of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See supra note 218 and accompanying text. Finally, if it is an error in applying originalism, Scalia is the
worst offender. As Professor Davies points out, in Davis, Scalia "cited twelve state cases, all but one
of which were decided in the nineteenth century." See Davies, supra note 209, at 374-75.
225. See, e.g., Mattox 11, 156 U.S. at 243-44.
226. See id.
227. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,400 (1965).
228. See Polelle, supra note 3, at 288 ("The alleged uniqueness of this exception would defy the
clear logic of Crawford.").
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the government to create evidence for prosecution,29 running afoul of
every principle espoused by Crawford, except its alleged originalism.
Justice Scalia is in the untenable position of making an exception for a
type of hearsay that is designed to lead to highly formal evidence manu-
factured by the government in anticipation of prosecution-the quintes-
sential definition of testimonial.
As a result of the current confrontation jurisprudence we are in the
preposterous position of having one major categorical exception to the
Confrontation Clause that modern authorities do not credit as rational or
persuasive. Few believe in the policy justification of dying declarations,
but we apply its limitations strictly, focusing on the imminence of death.
Modern courts require the declarant's belief in his or her impending
death not because they actually think this requirement promotes accura-
cy; rather, courts do so because they wish to apply dying declarations
narrowly, to limit the reach of this highly questionable hearsay exception.
Ironically, the history of the dying declaration indicates that rather
than being a categorical exception to confrontation, it served as a prag-
matic, flexible instrument. Accordingly, modern evidence jurisprudence
has taken what was perceived as a reliable exception meant to promote
justice and has transformed it into a categorical exception based on prin-
ciples no longer credited, but applied strictly to limit its use. Rather than
cling to the unsound formalism of the dying declaration exception, we
should perhaps think less in terms of history and more in terms of fair-
ness and practical function.
Dying declarations were admissible at the time the Sixth Amend-
ment was written. This is clearly enough justification for Justice Scalia,
who neither demands nor provides any reasoned argument in favor of
the exception, which to be fair, he mentions only in passing.23° Dying
declarations present an originalist conundrum. Such exception to the
confrontation right clearly existed at the time the Sixth Amendment was
written, and our Founding Fathers seemed to have expected it to contin-
ue. Some dying declarations, such as when the soon-to-be deceased per-
son makes a statement about the cause of her death to a police officer or
in such a manner as to implicate the accused for the purposes of future
prosecution, clearly trigger Crawford's core concern. Under Crawford,
unless the accused had an opportunity to cross-examine the dying decla-
rant, the out-of-court unswom statement violates the confrontation
right.31 Hence, dying declaration forms an outright refutation of Craw-
ford's rule concerning testimonial statements.
The dying declaration exception makes a strong historical, logical,
and policy argument against Justice Scalia's entire conceptualization and
application of the Sixth Amendment confrontation right. Justice Scalia is
229. See The King v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 352 (P.C.).
230. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,56 n.6 (2004).
231. Id. at 36-37.
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inflexible about the "constitutional command" of confrontation.23 2 His
originalist approach, however, requires him to make an exception for dy-
ing declarations. But that exception makes no sense except for its history
and tradition. If viewed in its historical context, dying declarations, like
former testimony, represent a practical compromise between the absolut-
ist language of the Sixth Amendment and the underlying reasoning and
policy of the Confrontation Clause.
The treatment of the dying declaration as a necessary exception to
the Confrontation Clause represents more than a mere historical anoma-
ly. It is very clear that in the mid to late nineteenth century the Court
supported exceptions to the Confrontation Clause for the purposes of
justice and fairness. 3 The dying declaration was just one exception (for-
feiture, former testimony, and res gestae were others).24
One can still insist on an interpretation of the right to confrontation
that is meaningful and has teeth without resorting to unhelpful, if histori-
cally inaccurate, categorical exceptions. Rather than slavishly tracking
the requirements of the dying declaration or making fine distinctions be-
tween comments made to secure help versus those made to alert authori-
ties, we should ask ourselves about the fairness and accuracy of the
process. If there are to be exceptions to the constitutional command,
they should be for good reason, not merely tradition.
In Dowdell v. United States,215 the Court observed that "this general
rule of law embodied in the Constitution, and... intended to secure the
right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face, and to thus sift the
testimony produced against him, has always had certain well recognized
exceptions." 6 The Mattox cases make that clear. 7 Furthermore, as the
Court observed in Snyder v. Massachusetts,z s "[t]he exceptions are not
232. See id. at 59-61.
233. See, e.g., Mattox 1I, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895); Mattox 1, 146 U.S. 140,140-41 (1892).
234. An ongoing debate runs regarding whether any hearsay exceptions other than dying declara-
tions were recognized by the Founders. Scalia clearly believes so. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, 58 n.8
(citing business records and spontaneous statements). Professor Polelle seems to agree. See Polelle,
supra note 3, at 292 ("No legal historian has been found who would define dying declarations as the
only criminal hearsay exception at common law."). Professor Davies, however, argues just that. See
Davies, supra note 209, at 392 ("[E]xcept for a dying declaration of a murder victim, there was no rec-
ognized exception to the ban against admitting unsworn hearsay as evidence of a defendant's guilt in a
felony trial."). The historical record is scant and murky, but Professor Davies makes a compelling case
that most if not all of the hearsay exceptions aside from dying declarations arose after the framing of
the Sixth Amendment.
235. 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
236. Id. at 330; see also Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899) ("[The dying declaration
exception] was well established before the adoption of the constitution, and was not intended to be
abrogated.").
237. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text; see also Raeder, supra note 157 (advocating a
return to the flexibility of Mattox).
238. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
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even static, but may be enlarged from time to time if there is no material
departure from the reason of the general rule."239
The actual approach of cases in the nineteenth and early twentieth
century to the Confrontation Clause is at fundamental odds with Justice
Scalia's so-called historical view. As the cases above indicate, for long
periods of our legal history, long before the much maligned Roberts case,
confrontation was never as absolute a demand as Scalia would have us
think. Ironically, Crawford and its progeny have entrenched the dying
declaration as an exception to the Confrontation Clause-thereby mak-
ing categorical what was previously flexible-and of course reflecting
policy that no longer fully resonates with modern sensibilities.
Given Justice Scalia's vehemence, and the recentness of Crawford
and its progeny, it is obviously pointless to argue for a return to a rigor-
ous Roberts test. It is also important to appreciate that Crawford has
done some good in decoupling hearsay and confrontation. Nevertheless,
it is useful to realize that dying declarations unmask the hollowness of
the Court's categorical approach. Although post-Crawford it is outr6 to
ask about such things, it is fruitful to wonder how cases of intimate part-
ner violence can be handled in a way that is fair to the accused and res-
pectful of victims.
IV. THE REMARKABLE AND UNREMARKED ROLE OF WOMEN IN
CONFRONTATION AND DYING DECLARATIONS
A. Crawford and Gender
In three out of the four modern Supreme Court confrontation cases,
the declarants are women and the accuseds are the men they love or
once loved.240
A feminist analysis of these three cases can begin with observations
about how the various victims are harmed. The Court refers to the "de-
clarant" to describe the person who makes the out-of-court statement.
This abstract, bloodless term masks the humanity, drama, and gender of
those who made key statements. As the jurisprudence has developed,
particularly since Crawford, we are instructed not to care much about the
contents of the declaration or the credibility of said declarant. Instead
we are encouraged to focus on the facts and procedures surrounding the
statements: when did the declarants make their declarations? to whom?
under what state of mind? (about to die? fear of attack? wanting to re-
port?). Procedurally, we are concerned with whether the declarants are
239. Id. at 107-08 ("Nor has the privilege of confrontation at any time been without recognized
exceptions, as for instance dying declarations or documentary evidence."). Snyder's discussion in dicta
of the right to jury trial was overruled by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1968).
240. See supra Parts II.A-B. The fourth, Melendez-Diaz, is a case involving scientific testimony at
trial. The evidence there does not concern the major players or events, instead it relates to presenta-
tion of the post-indictment forensic evidence.
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available to make these same claims in open court where the accused can
challenge them. Issues of reliability or trustworthiness are the purview of
hearsay law and almost entirely irrelevant to confrontation after Craw-
ford.
In various ways, the women of Crawford, Davis, Hammond, and
Giles respectively are officially silenced. In Crawford, the prosecutor
was prohibited from using the stationhouse statement of Sylvia Craw-
ford, the accused's wife. Sylvia Crawford's statement satisfied hearsay
concerns,"' although it failed Confrontation Clause analysis. 42  Under
Washington State law, Sylvia Crawford could not be compelled to take
the stand against her husband.4 3 It forbids a spouse from testifying
against the other spouse without the latter's consent. Hence, in Wash-
ington, each spouse could enforce the other's testimonial silence.2"
The facts do not indicate whether Sylvia Crawford wanted to testify,
but there are strong indications that she did not. Sylvia's statement to
the police included her belief that her husband Michael was "'one of the
most fair people you'll ever meet' and that he was her 'best friend.
'
'
2 45
After all, he was vindicating her honor, albeit unadvisedly, using vigi-
lante justice. Additionally, Sylvia, who assisted her husband and was on
the scene for the stabbing, was a potential accused, and would have
probably invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. 46 In Crawford's brief to the Supreme Court, he attributed
241. Her stationhouse statement was admissible as a declaration against interest under Washing-
ton law, and no marital privilege attached to it (as opposed to in-court testimony). See supra note 128
and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part II.A.
243. Under Washington state spousal-privilege law, "Crawford invoked the marital privilege,
RCW 5.60.060, to keep his wife from testifying against him at trial." State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656,
658 (Wash. 2002). At the time, the spousal privilege in Washington stated, in relevant part: "A hus-
band shall not be examined for or against his wife, without the consent of the wife, nor a wife for or
against her husband without the consent of the husband." Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1)
(amended 2006)).
244. Cf Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52-53 (1980) (holding that the federal common
law of spousal privilege belongs to the testifying spouse, not the accused spouse, and observing that
the former rule, which is still followed by the State of Washington, had roots in the sexist concept of
women's legal status merging with their husbands). The Supreme Court of Washington explained that
the privilege statute "specifically denies Sylvia the ability to testify either for or against her husband,
rendering her unavailable as a witness. Although Michael, not Sylvia, invoked the privilege, the result
is the same-Sylvia was unavailable to testify....." Crawford, 54 P.3d at 659. As the Washington Ap-
pellate Court explained: "Michael had a statutory right to keep his wife from testifying against him."
State v. Crawford, No 25307-1-1, 2001 WL 850119, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30,2001).
245. Crawford, 2001 WL 850119, at *3. Sylvia Crawford also said of her husband Michael that he
was "'infuriated,' 'enraged,' and 'past tipsy'; Sylvia also acknowledged that Michael stabbed the vic-
tim, and that Michael said Lee, the victim who was stabbed, "'deserves a ass whoopin."' Id. This, and
the fact that she contradicted Michael's account and did not see a knife in the victim's hands, is un-
doubtedly why the prosecutor wished to introduce her stationhouse statement.
246. This argument was made by the accused in his Petition to the Supreme Court, and the peti-
tioner noted that, after his trial, Sylvia was also charged with a crime based on the stabbing incident.
Brief for Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940, at
*5 n.l.
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the choice to invoke the privilege to both husband and wife.247 There-
fore, it is fair to assume that Sylvia was happy to assist her husband and
did not wish to testify.
Technically, however, the Washington statutory privilege scheme
did not permit her to make the choice; the privilege belonged to Sylvia's
husband, Michael, and it allowed him unilaterally to decide whether Syl-
via would be forced to "stand by her man. 2 48 It is crucial to note, how-
ever, that the declarant in Crawford was not also the victim. The man
Sylvia stood by did not try to harm her (although his impetuous, drunken
desire for revenge may have embroiled her in legal troubles). Sylvia, the
declarant, certainly had a romantic relationship with the accused (her
husband), yet there is nothing to indicate that it was an abusive one. In
addition, her statement was not about a hurt received from the accused,
but rather concerned the tangle between the accused and another man.
Issues of gender figure significantly in the Crawford drama, and the law
of privilege does silence Sylvia; nevertheless, we may not be too con-
cerned about squelching her voice or our failure to hear what she had to
say in open court, because she apparently had affirmatively chosen not to
speak.
In Davis and its companion case, Hammon, 249 there is uncertainty
about what the victim wants and confusion about issues of agency and
empowerment. The statements of Michelle McCottry, the victim in Da-
vis, to the 911 dispatcher were found to be excited utterances by Wash-
ington State and deemed nontestimonial under Crawford and thus were
admitted.250 The accused in Davis was convicted of violating a no-contact
order, indicating that the victim had previously tangled with the accused
and sought help from the legal system.251 McCottry hung up when she
originally called 911 and only spoke to the dispatcher when the dispatch-
er called back.252 McCottry also covered her face when the police at-
tempted to take pictures of her injuries.253 According to the police officer
who answered the call, McCottry's main concern involved "frantic efforts
to gather her belongings and her children so that they could leave the
247. Id. at *5 ("[T]he State and Petitioner stipulated that Washington's marital privilege statute
rendered her unavailable to do so because she and Petitioner wanted to invoke the privilege.").
248. "Stand by Your Man," is a country-western song co-written, performed, and made famous by
Tammy wynette. TAMMY WYNE'IrE, Stand By Your Man, on TAMMY WYNETTE'S GREATEST HITS
(Epic Records 1989). It encourages women to stick by their men even when they have been wronged
by them. It is an odd mixture of subordination on the one hand with disdain on the other. The song
counsels: "You'll have bad times and he'll have good times/ Doin' things that you don't understand/
But if you love him you'll forgive him/ Even though he's hard to understand." But also explains in
mitigation that "after all, he's just a man." Id.
249. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
250. See State v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661,664-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
251. Id. at 663.
252. Id. As the Supreme Court of Washington once noted, "a hang-up call often signals that the
caller is in grave danger." State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844,850 (Wash. 2005).
253. Davis, 64 P.3d at 663.
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residence. '254 The Washington Supreme Court noted that, "[a]lthough
she initially cooperated with the prosecutor's office, the State was unable
to locate McCottry at the time of trial. 25
5
Amy Hammon, the victim in the companion case, remained married
to the accused. 256 Although she was subpoenaed by the prosecutor, she
did not appear at trial. 7 In fact, she wrote the court regarding the ac-
cused's sentencing:
In answer to your letter there has been no damages or bills. As for
sentencing, I would like my husband, Hershel Hammon, to receive
counceling [sic] and go to AA, because it has helped him in the
past. I would like to see him put on probation to ensure that it hap-
pens and where he can still work to help financially and be here to
help with our children. I also need his help around the house for
we're remodeling the house and plan to sell it so we can move out
of town. I love my husband, I just want to see him stop drinking. I
do not feel threatened by his presence.258
The victims in Davis and Hammon refused to testify but the prose-
cutors chose to use their statements anyway. In fact, those statements
were vital to securing the convictions because, as is often the case, the
victims were the only eye witnesses to the actual battery. Before Craw-
ford, using such statements with or without the victim's permission was
standard procedure; many statements were admissible even if the decla-
rant did not show up to testify and was therefore not subject to cross-
examination. The prosecutorial "no drop" strategy is significantly harder
post-Crawford and Davis.259 If the statement is testimonial, then the
woman has to testify. And if she will not, the prosecutor does not have a
case.
Why did the victims in Davis and Hammon fail to testify? Had they
made up with their lovers? This seems to be the case with Amy Ham-
mon. Did they want to prevent their intimate partners from having legal
problems? Did they want to spare themselves the hassle or their children
the agony? This is also a possibility. Were they disgusted with the jus-
254. See Davis, 111 P.3d at 847.
255. Id. Because the Washington courts were applying the Roberts test, which focuses on reliabil-
ity, see supra Part II.A, the motive of the declarant in not appearing in court was not deemed relevant,
and there was little information about why McCottry did not testify.
256. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind. 2005).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 448 n.3.
259. As Tom Lininger noted:
In a survey of over 60 prosecutors' offices in California, Oregon, and Washington, 63 per-
cent of respondents reported the Crawford decision has significantly impeded prosecutions of
domestic violence. Seventy-six percent indicated that after Crawford, their offices are more likely
to drop domestic violence charges when the victims recant or refuse to cooperate. Alarmingly, 65
percent of respondents reported that victims of domestic violence are less safe in their jurisdic-
tions than during the era preceding the Crawford decision.
Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 750 (2005) (citations omit-
ted).
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tice system?2" Were they ashamed? Or were they frightened off? Did
the accuseds intimidate them from testifying? If the women in Davis and
Hammon were indeed intimidated by their partners, Giles might apply.
Courts and commentators have been struggling with what consti-
tutes intimidation within the context of a violent intimate relationship.
2 6
'
Clearly one of the challenges confrontation jurisprudence must address is
what counts as making a witness unavailable. Things get murky once we
leave the world of express threats and one-way tickets out of town. And,
in particular, what counts as making someone unavailable in the context
of an ongoing relationship with a history of violence? 62
It is worthwhile to note the potential real-world harm of Giles. As
Chief Justice Roberts observed, the Giles ruling gives batterers a benefit
for killing their victims instead of just injuring them by allowing them to
testify later.2 63  Professor Lininger cites the paradox of Giles in which
"the more the criminal justice system insists upon live testimony by the
accuser, the less likely it is that she will actually appear in court.""26 The
accused, who is already in a struggle for dominance and control over his
partner, will become aware that the prosecution cannot proceed without
the victim's testimony. Lininger argues that this will increase witness
tampering.2 6  Justice Scalia, however, has made perfectly clear that any
such practical concerns about the ability to prosecute, the potential dan-
gers witnesses might face, or the cost-benefit analysis of insisting that the
accused show up are out of bounds when it comes to the command of the
Confrontation Clause.
Is such use of the victim's statements respectful of the woman's in-
terest, preserving her voice, or is it subversive of her choices? There is a
rich literature on the "no drop" prosecution policy, in which prosecutors
260. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Vi-
olence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241,1257 (1991) ("Women of color are often reluc-
tant to call the police, a hesitancy likely due to a general unwillingness among people of color to sub-
ject their private lives to the scrutiny and control of a police force that is frequently hostile."); Cheryl
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1880-81 (1996) ("African-American women may be very suspicious of the crimi-
nal justice system because it has historically ignored violence against black women and perpetrated
violence against black men.").
261. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 146, at 364-65; Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach
to the Right of Confrontation and Its Loss, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 725,746-47 (2007).
262. Tom Lininger has written a thoughtful and useful piece outlining criteria that courts should
use in assessing forfeiture. "Taking its cue from Scalia's declared preference for categorical rules," the
article provides practical guidelines for assessing the accused's intent to cause unavailability, finding
"the requisite intent where the defendant has violated a restraining order, committed any act of vi-
olence while judicial proceedings are pending, or engaged in a prolonged pattern of abusing and isolat-
ing the victim." Lininger, supra note 157, at 865. Intimidation can take many forms, and courts will
need to be aware that not only physical force, but credible threats to harm the victim, harm the vic-
tim's children, or to separate the victim from her children will count as the type of intimidation that
should trigger forfeiture. See id. at 895.
263. Lininger, supra note 157. at 864.
264. Id. at 871.
265. Id.
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try cases with a woman's statement from the crime scene even if she later
chooses not to cooperate."6
Some feminists have even hailed Davis as an end to the disrespect
of the victims represented by "no drop" prosecutions.267 So in weighing
the social benefits of such testimony, one must include not only the dam-
age done to the accused's ability to mount a defense, but the damage
done to the witness who has chosen not to participate in the prosecution.
The final confrontation case that raises gender issues, Giles, in-
volves femicide of an intimate partner. We know that Brenda Avie, the
ex-girlfriend of the accused, was shot and killed. 68 The confrontation is-
sue posed in Giles concerned Avie's statements made to police, who re-
sponded to a domestic violence incident between Avie and the accused
three weeks prior to the homicide.269 Those statements, assumed by the
Court to be testimonial,2 70 arguably elucidated the nature of the relation-
ship, belying the accused's assertions that he feared Avie and memorial-
izing or chronicling a pattern of brutality of the accused towards her. 71
We do not know what Avie would have liked done with her statement to
police. Unlike the victims in Davis and Hammon, who were able to vote
with their feet, Avie was murdered and unable to participate in the pros-
ecution of her batterer. She spoke to police and indicated some willing-
ness at that time to assist in the prosecution of the accused, but she was
silenced by the accused as well as by the legal system.
What about dying declarations by victims of femicide? If Avie had
lived long enough to make a dying statement to the police surrounding
the events of her murder, we would know at least one thing for sure: she
intended to have her statement used to prosecute the accused. Ironical-
ly, the very thing that makes the statement problematic from a confron-
tation perspective-its testimonial quality-is what makes it respectful of
the victim and allows us, with no conflict regarding her agency or choice,
to let her be heard.
266. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 260, at 1899-1906 (arguing that prosecutors should reduce their
reliance on victim testimony by gathering other types of evidence, but advocating for mandatory vic-
tim participation if necessary); Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Job Description for the
Battered Woman's Prosecutor and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 183, 187-91
(1997) (arguing that blanket "no drop" policies do not promote battered women's safety, and suggest-
ing a more flexible approach to prosecution).
267. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Bailey, The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: Deconstructing the
Sound of Silence, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 ("[A] limitation on victimless prosecutions is not necessar-
ily a setback .... ).
268. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681 (2008).
269. Id. at 2681-82.
270. See id. at 2682. Justices Thomas and Alito expressed doubts whether Avie's statement to
police was testimonial. Justice Thomas, consistent with his opinion in Davis, thought Avie's statement
lacked the requisite formality. Id. at 2692-94 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Alito did not provide a
specific reason, but opined that "I am not convinced that the out-of-court statement at issue here fell
within the Confrontation Clause in the first place." Id. at 2694. Because the issue was never con-
tested, both reached the forfeiture question and joined the majority.
271. See id. at 2681-82.
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Where there is no evidence that the victim was subject to intimida-
tion, and she is still alive, however, we may choose to rely on the victim's
perspective and choices. Her desire not to testify is a willful silence that
many argue should be respected. Women who suffer violence from inti-
mates also suffer loss of control over their movements and choices as
well. Once we have determined that women are not withholding their
testimony out of fear, or even if they are afraid, they have made the cal-
culated choice that their silence will protect them better than the legal
system, it is arguably intrusive and paternalistic to use their statements
where they have chosen not to testify.
In contrast to the women who hesitate to testify in Davis and Ham-
mon, a murdered woman who makes her accusations as she slips out of
life, knowing full well that she is dying, has not chosen silence. Quite the
opposite: she has used her dying breaths to give evidence against the ac-
cused. (Moreover, it hardly seems to matter whether she speaks formally
and gives what would otherwise look like a testimonial statement, or de-
livers her dying declarations to family, friends, or casual bystanders.)
Generally, the effect of the evidence rules in combination with the Con-
frontation Clause and the strict definition of testimonial statements
would exclude such remarks to police-though arguably courts will ad-
mit similar statements made informally to others. If dicta in Crawford
and Giles are to be believed, however, they are admissible as dying dec-
larations.
B. Dying Declarations and the Plight of Intimate Partners
The relationship between dying declarations and domestic violence
goes way back. A D.C. Circuit Court case from 1802, notable for its
brevity, holds in its entirety: "THE COURT permitted her dying declara-
tions to be given in evidence. 22 The accused McGurk was convicted of
the "murder of his wife, by beating her, while pregnant with twins, so as
to produce a miscarriage and consequent death. 273 There has always
been a significant and intriguing subset of dying declarations, both now
and in the past, made by women, naming their intimate partners as their
murderers. Other interesting dying declaration cases that overtly involve
gender surround issues of abortion274 or seduction.2 75 Women play an im-
272. United States v. McGurk, 26 F. Cas. 1097, 1097 (C.C.D.C. 1802).
273. Id.
274. The issue of abortion presented a conundrum for dying declarations. If a man was charged
with procuring an abortion for a woman who died and made statements about the cause of her death
implicating the accused, courts disagreed whether the dying declaration could apply if the charge was
not homicide. See State v. Fuller, 96 P. 456, 457 (Or. 1908) ("The dying declarations of a woman, upon
whom an abortion had been performed, were not originally admissible, on the ground that her death
was not an essential ingredient of the offense which was complete without it: but when her demise, as a
result of a premature delivery produced by another person, is made by statute an indispensable consti-
tuent of the crime as charged, her dying declarations are receivable in evidence."); Nicolas, supra note
11, at 525 ("U.S. courts were divided on the question of whether dying declarations were admissible in
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portant role in the new confrontation jurisprudence; they have an unhe-
ralded niche in dying declarations, and it is more timely than ever to ask
how these swirling factors of confrontation rights, dying declarations, and
gender operate together.
If the policy goal were to admit all prior statements of women who
have been killed by their batterers (a goal attempted via a forfeiture
theory and defeated by the majority in Giles), dying declarations as the
only exception would be underinclusive. Not all statements made by a
victim of intimate violence would qualify. The statement must not only
concern the cause of death, but the victim must know that death is immi-
nent. Statements of fear by women who anticipate well in advance that
they will suffer violence from a specific individual do not qualify for the
dying declaration. As the Supreme Court of California explained over a
hundred years ago:
The declarations of the deceased, made to various persons and
at different times prior to his death, to the effect that he was going
to leave the country, because he was afraid [the defendant] would
murder him; that [the defendant] was engaged with others in hold-
ing meetings, and conspiring to take his life.., were not admissible
under any known principle or rule of evidence.276
In truth, such predictions that someone plans to kill you have enormous
emotional power at the murder trial. We see them in modern cases-
Nicole Simpson's letters left in a safety deposit box that O.J. was out to
kill her,2 77 as well as letters left by less famous victims predicting their
prosecutions for illegal abortion under the common law dying declaration exception."). The abortion
cases form a fascinating subset of the larger dying declaration question. Because doctors would often
withhold treatment until the woman named her lover and the procurer of her abortion, the actual
strictures of the exception did not seem to be met. The women were led to believe there would be
some hope of recovery if they named names. See Leslie J. Reagan, "About to Meet Her Maker":
Women, Doctors, Dying Declarations, and the State's Investigation of Abortion, Chicago, 1867-1940, 77
J. AM. HIST. 1240, 1254-55 (1991).
275. In M'Farland v. Shaw, an action was "brought by the father, for an injury done to him, by the
loss of his daughter's service, in consequence of her seduction by the defendant, and incidental ill-
ness." 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 187, 189 (1815). The court was aware that it was extending the reach of
the dying declaration in applying it to a civil lawsuit for support, but the court argued forcefully that a
dying declaration must serve as competent evidence in this case as well: "Can the practice of receiving
it to destroy life, and rejecting it where a compensation is sought for a civil injury, derive any sanction
from reason, justice, or analogy? And though no direct precedent may exist to guide the court, yet it
must be recollected that the law consists of principles, which precedents only tend to illustrate and
confirm." Id. at 190.
276. People v. Irwin, 20 P. 56,57 (Cal. 1888).
277. See Ruling, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18,
1995) ("To the man or woman on the street, the relevance and probative value of [diary entries and
statements to others] is both obvious and compelling, especially those statements made just days be-
fore the homicide."); Lenora Ledwon, Diaries and Hearsay: Gender, Selfiood, and the Trustworthiness
of Narrative Structure, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1185, 1186 n.12 (2000) (discussing Nicole Brown Simpson's
diary and the California hearsay statute that was passed in part because of the exclusion of the diary
from the O.J. Simpson criminal trial); Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, Simpson Jury Hears 911 Calls of
'93 Incident, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at A7 ("[The safe deposit box held] photographs showing [Ni-
cole Brown Simpson] with injuries, letters from [O.J.] Simpson apologizing and taking responsibility
for a 1989 fight, and a copy of her will.").
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own murders.2"' Such statements are wrenching as well as eerie in their
prescience. The person who is ultimately a murder victim shares his
deepest and, it seems, well-founded fears. But such cases fail the stric-
tures of the dying declaration exception because although they anticipate
death, death is not certain or imminent. Giles, the case in which the vic-
tim made a statement to police about threats several weeks before she
was killed, including the allegation that the accused threatened her life,
fits this pattern of voices from the grave that fail the dying declaration
requirement.27 9
Reliance on the dying declaration exception seems to undervalue
women's understanding of the arc of their relationships. The imminence
requirement is a mismatch with women's experience. Imminence means
the declarant has to know that she is just about to die. But what if, like
Avie in Giles, the woman can tell that she is going to die by the hand of
her lover? Her experience with escalating violence and his moods in-
form her that he will soon kill her. The law does not recognize that way
of knowing. The dying declaration covers only a subset of cases involv-
ing women killed by intimate partners, and even then, it is not a perfect
fit. Nevertheless, dying declarations do seem like one small way of hear-
ing the victims of domestic violence-not all of them of course-but
those who were killed, knew they were about to die, and made state-
ments concerning their imminent deaths.
Which voices of victims get to be heard at trial? The only way we
can hear the testimonial statement of a dead woman is if the declarant
forfeited his confrontation right (by killing the victim in order to shut her
up, as required by Giles) or if she made a valid dying declaration.
V. CONCERN FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: SEARCHING FOR A
FAIR BALANCE IN THE ADMISSION OF UNCONFRONTED STATEMENTS
BY VICTIMS OF FEMICIDE
If dying declarations serve as an exception to the confrontation rule
and present a partial way in which victims of femicide can be heard, we
need at least acknowledge the burden on the accuseds and see whether it
is a tolerable diminution of their constitutional rights.m By adopting a
wooden, categorical system, in which dying declarations are a separate,
historically anomalous category, Justice Scalia has spared himself and the
278. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 907 A.2d 3, 8-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (discussing
letter left by murder victim about discovering his wife's plan to murder him and outlining how she and
her lover would commit the crime).
279. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681--82 (2008).
280. Professor Myrna Raeder has modeled candor and compassion in her search for a balance.
See Raeder, supra note 146, at 313-14 ("As a feminist who is also concerned about the defendant's
right to confrontation, I have long pondered the proper balance to ensure that the voices of women
and children are heard, without eviscerating the ability of the defendant to confront live complainants,
and not just second hand witnesses.").
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rest of us the bother of thinking about the fairness of admitting such evi-
dence. In fact, in Giles, Scalia mocks the concept of being "fair," actually
putting the word in quotation marks."8 Even if his originalist and abso-
lutist approach is correct, it is worthwhile to examine and acknowledge
the costs of admitting statements by a victim who can never be con-
fronted. What is the harm to the accused? How might the strictures of
the dying declaration exception mitigate those harms somewhat?
As tough as it is to ignore an abused woman's final words, it may al-
so be dangerous to allow them in. Beyond the issue of accurate tran-
scription, we must worry about the power of this dying voice, which
could be mistaken, vengeful, or conniving. Without confrontation, there
is no way for the jury to distinguish. As important as it is to listen to
abused women's voices, we have to be equally concerned about the ac-
cused, who must be presumed innocent, but whose denials perhaps could
not be heard over a powerful voice from the grave. In short, we must
worry, in the famous words of Justice Cardozo, about the "reverberating
clang ' 282 of words that are desperate, damning, and not subject to cross-
examination.
Admitting some statements of domestic violence killings if they
happen to fall within the strictures of the dying declaration may appear
like a preposterous standard, defensible only on the grounds Justice Sca-
lia presents: that's how our Founding Fathers did it.23 Admissibility
seems based not on the rights of the accused or some policy that reflects
accuracy or reliability, but upon a historical yet currently disfavored doc-
trine. It presumes a world that we modern folks no longer recognize,
replete with doctors who tell it to the patient straight and a rigid belief
system in an afterlife and a personal, vengeful God.
However, the unique limitations of dying declarations, at least as
applied to domestic violence killings, make some sense. Although the
following observations cannot fully rehabilitate the contradictions and
absurdities inherent in the dying declaration exception or restore an in-
terest in fairness to confrontation analysis, they can offer some comfort
to those frustrated with the odd and dissatisfying results of the Supreme
Court's new approach.
Setting aside any religious justifications, it is worthwhile to examine
the critiques and potential justifications of the dying declaration excep-
281. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692 ("The larger problem with the dissent's argument, however, is that
the guarantee of confrontation is no guarantee at all if it is subject to whatever exceptions courts from
time to time consider 'fair.' It is not the role of courts to extrapolate from the words of the Sixth
Amendment to the values behind it, and then to enforce its guarantees only to the extent they serve
(in the courts' views) those underlying values."); cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S.
604, 623-24 (1990) (also putting "fair" in quotation marks to emphasize his distance from the term and
question its legitimacy).
282. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
283. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687 ("Not only was the State's proposed exception to the right of
confrontation plainly not an 'exceptio[n] established at the time of the Founding,' it is not established
in American jurisprudence since the Founding.") (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
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tion to see how they play out in the context of a trial for homicide of an
intimate partner.
Some of the criticisms of the dying declaration exception do not
seem to apply to women killed by their partners. The concern that accu-
racy of perception and memory may affect a dying declaration seems
more apt in describing a mortal wound by a stranger than a declaration
describing a deadly blow inflicted by a lover. The case law, however,
makes absolutely no distinction between statements about strangers and
statements about lovers. But we can be fairly confident that at the very
least in the latter case, the identification is unlikely to be mistaken.
Problems with accuracy are less likely in dying declarations made by in-
timate partners.
Arguably, there is an increased chance of a "sincerity" problem in
intimate partner cases. One could raise the concern that as the woman is
dying, she acts out of revenge or bitterness against her lover who has hurt
her in the past. Killed by another person, by the accused in self-defense,
or by her own hand, the woman might make a dying statement about her
partner and wrongfully implicate him in her homicide. Although such
last-minute retribution with false charges is certainly possible, this con-
cern seems minimal given what we know about the psychological dynam-
ics of battering relationships.
Abused women often stick with their abusers and make excuses for
them.2 m Many battered women behave as did Amy Hammon, who asked
the court to show the assailant leniency.2 5 It is unlikely that a woman
with a track record of tolerating or managing violence in her relationship
would, just at the moment of death, seek unfair payback. In fact, the
case law reveals multiple occasions where women killed by their intimate
partners actually use their last statements to attempt to exonerate the
clearly guilty accuseds. For instance, in Sims v. State,286 the declarant said
before she died: "Well, I don't want him arrested. I was as much to
blame as he was, and I want him here to take care of the children."' 7
Similarly, in Spicer v. State,2 forensic evidence clearly pointed to the
husband as the shooter, but the dying declarant falsely blamed a "negro"
and told her doctor that it was good that she, not her husband, was shot
by the negro because her husband "could take so much better care of the
children than she." 9 This unwillingness, even in the last moments of life,
to name her intimate partner as her assailant is also a modern phenome-
284. See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefini-
tion of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1224-25 (1993) (discussing the psycho-
logical dynamics of the battered woman's attachment to her abuser, citing the initial love, and later
dependence and lack of self-worth).
285. See id. (describing the intense emotional attachments that develop, often clouding victims'
judgment).
286. 263 S.W. 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1924).
287. Id. at 290.
288. 65 So. 972 (Ala. 1914).
289. Id. at 974.
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non displayed in State v. Townsend.2 ° In Townsend, the woman who
died from a beating by her live-in boyfriend repeatedly claimed to police
as she was dying that she was hit by a car.
291
Although it is not demonstrable empirically, the psychology of
abuse victims points to truthfulness when a dying woman names her in-
timate partner. Much more likely than a vengeance hypothesis is the no-
tion that abused women will finally reveal the truth about who's hurting
them because they have nothing left to lose. Based on the psychological
profile and life circumstances of domestic battery victims, perhaps what
animates the victim to finally report her abuse with her dying breath-
knowing (as the exception requires) that she is actually going to die im-
minently-is that she has nothing left to fear from her violent partner.
The sense of futility and defeat that is another classical explanation
for the dying declaration's trustworthiness-that the declarant has no
stake left among the living-arguably makes more sense in the context of
someone who has lost a long battle trying to outwit her tormenter. But a
stronger argument might be that the nearness of death has induced a
moral clarity: that the wrongful nature of the relationship and the futility
of trying to live with and outwit the danger prompt an attempt to speak
the truth, and perhaps provide some warning to others.
The quasi-forfeiture theory also makes sense in the domestic vi-
olence context, in which the defense is rarely mistaken identity but in-
stead justification or intent. If the accused raises self-defense or mistake
as the reason for the homicide, he thereby acknowledges that some ac-
tion of his caused his partner's death. Even if that action was ultimately
justifiable or truly a mistake, it does not presuppose guilt to find the ac-
cused responsible for making the declarant unavailable. One could im-
agine a principle of predictable consequences whereby, if an accused ac-
knowledges that he rendered his partner unavailable to testify, it opens
the door to her dying words.292 This does not meet the Giles standard for
intentionally procuring the witness's absence, but it is not an unfair pre-
sumption of guilt based solely on the accusation either.
In sum, one need not subscribe to a belief in heaven and hell to
think that the final words of an abused partner are more reliable than
prior hearsay statements made when not believing death was imminent.
This provides some justification for the result of the special exception for
dying declarations. At least in cases of domestic violence ending in
death, the strictures of the doctrine provide some checks on the unfair-
ness to the accused.
290. 897 A.2d 316 (N.J. 2006).
291. Id. at 321. In Townsend the court permitted expert testimony about battered women's syn-
drome to explain that women who are abused by intimate partners lie about the source of their inju-
ries to protect the batterers or to protect themselves from further abuse. Id. at 328.
292. See Friedman, supra note 121, at 12.
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There is one final, obvious point about fairness to the accused and
the use of dying declarations. The Crawford reinterpretation of confron-
tation limits the doctrine to testimonial statements only.29 3 Nontesti-
monial statements are left to the vagaries and vicissitudes of hearsay doc-
trine. Apparently, there is no longer any constitutional protection
against those. The Court argues as consolation for the evidence lost in
domestic violence cases that many excited utterances and dying declara-
tions will not be testimonial at all, and will therefore be admissible with-
out concern about confrontation. Thus, after Crawford, the problem for
the accused goes beyond odd historical exclusions of what are clearly
core testimonial statements. Crawford is also troubling for what it does
not cover within the narrow (if strictly applied) category of testimonial
statements. If one were to ask the forbidden fairness question so derided
by Justice Scalia, it would be hard from the accused's point of view to see
a distinction.
CONCLUSION
Given that the dying declaration is one of only two exceptions to
the constitutional command of confrontation-the other, forfeiture, is
more a matter of equity and clean hands than an actual exception-the
role of dying declarations takes on vastly increased importance. This is
true even though the exception is self-contradictory and limited. Run-
ning through the jurisprudence is an absolute insistence on the decla-
rant's apprehension of imminent death, with an undercurrent of skeptic-
ism about the entire enterprise.
Giles clearly indicates that dying declarations form a categorical ex-
ception to the confrontation right. 94 Yet, dying declarations themselves
present a challenge to Justice Scalia's confrontation jurisprudence. It is
simply not sufficient to label them, as Justice Scalia does in a footnote,
"sui generis" and be done with them.295 The Court, in advocating an ap-
proach to the Sixth Amendment that enshrines the dying declaration ex-
ception, ignores the policy-driven and nuanced approach to confronta-
tion. Justice Scalia refuses to entertain a policy discussion, yet the dying
declaration exception clearly arose from the very policy concerns he will
not address.
The statements of women killed by their intimate partners present
an excellent point of departure for discussing the value of dying declara-
tions. It is worth noticing the prominent role that women, and the acts of
violence against them, play behind the scenes in the new Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. Therefore, in addition to looking at the problem
doctrinally, it is important to realize that many of the confrontation cases
293. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
294. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682-83 (2008).
295. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (emphasis omitted).
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involve social phenomena where the women are nameless and, because
of evidence rules, voiceless. We can rightfully question the ability of
courts to understand the complicated dynamics of domestic violence as
they try to pigeonhole the declarations of victims.
We want to hear the voices of victims, particularly if they have been
killed and cannot testify. But we are also aware of the power of those
voices and the potential unfairness to the accused. The formal require-
ments of dying declarations seem to offer the worst of both worlds. An
exception for dying declarations makes little sense in a modern secular
society, but Justice Scalia and those who signed on to his opinions have
made clear that any discussion of policy or context is prohibited. Instead,
we are stuck with an illogical historical exception that courts will apply
narrowly, limiting its reach but nevertheless highlighting the bankruptcy
of Crawford's wooden, categorical approach.
Ironically, however, there is some comfort to be found in the opera-
tion of the dying declaration exception. At least in the case of women
killed by their intimate partners, the dying declaration-through histori-
cal accident rather than any sound policy-may present a reasonable
balance between the rights of the accused and the needs of society.
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